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BIGLAW IDENTITY CAPITAL:  
PINK AND BLUE, BLACK AND WHITE 
Eli Wald* 
INTRODUCTION 
A Caucasian male attorney joins a large law firm as a first year associate.  
In addition to his regular heavy workload, he is often invited to attend 
various firmwide events and functions, but his occasional absences are 
accepted and presumed to be the result of his work ethic and long billable 
hours.  Over time, he receives a steady flow of assignments, a reasonable 
mix of paperwork and more challenging, quality assignments.  He meets 
and develops an informal mentoring relationship with a few of the firm’s 
partners, including one or two of its powerful partners.  At times he 
experiences pressure to meet the firm’s expectations, yet he is always 
treated with respect by partners and associates who assume that he is 
competent and loyal to the firm and its clients.  Nothing in his formal and 
informal evaluations suggests any concerns, and he believes he is having a 
solid experience.  During his fourth year at the firm, an entity client for 
which he has been working for a year approaches him about joining its in-
house legal department.  He is flattered but decides to stay with the firm.  
Following his ninth year he is elected to the partnership. 
A Latina attorney joins a large law firm as a first year associate and is 
soon asked to join the firm’s diversity committee.  In addition to her regular 
heavy workload, she is often invited to attend various firmwide events and 
functions, where she is photographed and later featured prominently on the 
firm’s website and print publications.  She is also actively involved with the 
firm’s recruitment efforts, especially its efforts to recruit minority 
candidates.  Over time, she receives a steady flow of assignments, a 
reasonable mix of paperwork and more challenging, quality assignments.  
She meets and develops an informal mentoring relationship with a few of 
the firm’s partners, including one or two of its minority partners.  At times 
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David Wilkins, Kevin Woodson, and the participants at The Challenge of Equity and 
Inclusion in the Legal Profession:  An International and Comparative Perspective 
Colloquium held at Fordham University School of Law.  I also thank Diane Burkhardt, 
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she experiences implicit pressure to work her personal and professional 
identity to meet the firm’s cultural expectations,1 and sometimes she feels 
she is being treated disrespectfully by partners and associates who seem to 
imply that she may have been hired and retained in part because of her 
racial and gender identity; yet overall she is content at the firm.  Nothing in 
her formal and informal evaluations suggests any concerns, and she 
believes she is having a solid experience.  During her fourth year at the 
firm, an entity client for which she has been working for a year approaches 
her about joining its in-house legal department.  She is flattered and, 
mindful of the fact that the firm has but a few minority partners, accepts the 
job offer.  The firm and the associate part ways on amicable terms. 
In some ways, the experiences described above are similar and typical for 
associates at large law firms.  Working long hours while at the firm is 
common; so is the expectation that associates serve on committees and 
regularly attend firm functions.2  Even as BigLaw3 increasingly moves 
away from hiring large entry-level classes of associates,4 still most 
 
 1. Workplace actors, explain Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, “work their identity” 
when they “adopt strategies to signal that they are hard working, collegial, team oriented, 
and trust worthy.”  Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1259, 1263 (2000).  Identity work is necessary because firms value not only effort and 
merit but also qualities such as collegiality, collaboration, and commitment, which are hard 
to observe. Id. 
 2. Paul D. Cravath is credited with being among the first to mold and implement the 
basic organizational features of the modern large law firm. See WAYNE K. HOBSON, THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY, 1890–1930, at 196–200 
(1986); see also 1 ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS:  1819–
1947, at 1–4 (1946). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:  LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976); PAUL HOFFMAN, LIONS IN THE STREET:  THE 
INSIDE STORY OF THE GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS (1973); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL 
STREET LAWYER:  PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? (1964). 
 3. “BigLaw” references the largest law firms in the world, historically predominantly 
American yet increasingly global.  “Large,” however, has a dynamic meaning.  “[N]o firms 
of large membership appeared, even in the great cities, until the end of the [nineteenth] 
century.  The typical partnership was a two-man affair . . . .” JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE 
GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:  THE LAW MAKERS 306 (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2001) 
(1950).  Through the 1920s a firm of four attorneys was considered a “large” firm. See 
HOBSON, supra note 2, at 161.  The benchmark for “large” reached fifty attorneys by the 
1950s. See Erwin O. Smigel, The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large 
Law Firm, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 56, 56 n.1, 58 (1960). By the late 1980s, “a firm of 50 
members probably would not be considered large” in major cities. See Justin A. Stanley, 
Should Lawyers Stick to Their Last?, 64 IND. L.J. 473, 473 (1989).  Notably, in 1988, Baker 
& McKenzie became the first law firm with over 1000 attorneys. Nancy Blodgett, Law Firm 
Tops 1,000 Barrier, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1988, at 30.  In January 2015, multinational law firm 
Dentons and Dacheng Law Offices of China announced a merger, creating the world’s 
largest law firm with over 6500 lawyers in more than fifty countries.  Neil Gough, Dentons 
to Merge with Dacheng of China to Create World’s Largest Law Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/dentons-to-merge-with-dacheng-of-china-to-
create-worlds-largest-law-firm/?_r=0; see also Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The 
Elastic Tournament:  A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 
1873 n.23 (2008) (discussing the dynamic meaning of “large” firms). 
 4. Debra Cassens Weiss, Is the Law Firm Pyramid Collapsing?  BigLaw Is Aging with 
More Partners than Associates, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 16, 2013, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/is_the_law_firm_pyramid_collapsing_biglaw_is_ag
ing/; see also Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle:  Economic Perspectives 
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associates leave firms by their fourth or fifth year,5 and some go in-house 
with one of the firm’s entity clients.6  Next, associates typically have a 
mixed bag of assignments7 but form only a few informal mentoring 
relationships with senior associates and partners, who seem increasingly to 
have less time and interest in mentoring.8 
In other ways, however, these typical experiences differ notably.  First, 
while some Caucasian male associates are asked to serve on firm 
committees, female and minority associates are often overburdened with 
service commitments.  While all associates are expected to participate in 
firm activities, diverse attorneys experience a stronger pressure to visibly 
attend to allow the firm to publicly feature them as members of the firm.  In 
contrast, Caucasian men’s absence is often accepted and assumed to reflect 
their commitment to the firm and to billable work, rather than an indication 
of disinterest and disloyalty.  Next, while building mentorship relationships 
is challenging for all associates, minority associates often find the 
experience to be more challenging, and they are subtly directed or are 
drawn to minority partners, oftentimes partners without power or with less 
power than the firm’s leading rainmakers.9  Finally, while many associates 
feel the pressure to meet the firm’s cultural expectations and receive generic 
and unhelpful feedback, these phenomena disproportionately burden 
minority associates:  they often must invest more time and effort working 
their identity compared with their white male counterparts, and they are 
 
on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 31–33; Eli 
Wald, Smart Growth:  The Large Law Firm in the Twenty-First Century, 80 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2867, 2888–89 (2012). 
 5. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 3, at 1924 n.247 (citing Stephanie Francis 
Ward, The Ultimate Time-Money Trade-Off, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2007, at 24–25). 
 6. See Mary C. Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a 
Global Organization:  The Role of the General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1060 (1997); 
Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational 
Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 486 (1989). See generally Abram Chayes & Antonia H. 
Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 277 (1985); Robert L. 
Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs:  Constructing the Role of 
Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000). 
 7. David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers:  
Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law 
Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1608–13 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving 
the Tournament of Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few 
Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?  An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493, 
537–42 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers]. 
 8. Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:  An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, 
Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 
281–83 (2000) [hereinafter Fortney, Soul for Sale]; Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours 
Derby:  Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 
181 n.47 (2005) [hereinafter Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby]. 
 9. See generally ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:  THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So 
Few Black Lawyers, supra note 7; David B. Wilkins, “If You Can’t Join ’Em, Beat ’Em!” 
The Rise and Fall of the Black Corporate Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1733, 1744–46 
(2008). 
2512 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
often confronted with more imposing negative stereotypes, rendering the 
consequences of bland evaluations more pronounced.10 
What, if anything, do these experiences tell us about BigLaw practice, 
equality, and discrimination?  At first blush, both experiences appear to 
constitute stories of professional success.  BigLaw partners enjoy high 
professional, socioeconomic, and cultural status atop the legal profession.  
Similarly, in-house positions have become increasingly coveted and also 
confer high professional status.  At the same time, however, these narratives 
reveal disturbing patterns of disproportionately early exit, 
underrepresentation, and inequality affecting women and lawyers of color at 
BigLaw beyond the entry-level rank.11  Caucasian males are able to work 
longer billable hours, receive superior training, and form stronger 
mentorship relationships with powerful partners.  In turn, these associates 
receive higher quality assignments and end up better positioned to develop 
a book of business.  As a result, having proven themselves to be the “ideal 
workers,” white male associates do have a better chance of making 
partner.12  In contrast, women and minorities—burdened by service 
commitments to the firm that result in fewer billable hours and undermined 
by relationships with less powerful partners, as well as by negative gender 
and racial stereotypes—gradually receive lower quality assignments.13  By 
 
 10. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1270–72. See generally DEVON W. CARBADO & 
MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?  RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2014); KENJI 
YOSHINO, COVERING:  THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS (2006). 
 11. Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Recasting the Brass Ring:  Deconstructing 
and Reconstructing Workplace Opportunities for Women Lawyers, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 923, 
931 (2002); Deborah L. Rhode, From Platitudes to Priorities:  Diversity and Gender Equity 
in Law Firms, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1041, 1042–46 (2011). See generally Nancy J. 
Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete Ceilings in Legal 
Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27 (2004); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination 
and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who Is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 
24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079 (2011). 
 12. Joan Williams explains that “[m]arket work is structured around an ideal worker 
who takes no time off for childbearing, has no daytime child rearing responsibilities, and is 
available ‘full-time’ and for overtime at short notice.” Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Work 
and Family Entitlements Around Family Values, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 753 
(1996); see Joan Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822 (1989).  As 
large law firms increasingly adopt a 24/7, around the clock, client-centered ideology as the 
benchmark of professional excellence, see Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends:  
Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large 
Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2264–73 (2010), Caucasian male lawyers are 
reconstituted as BigLaw’s ideal workers. 
 13. As Deborah Rhode reminds us, the “conventional usage . . . referring to ‘women and 
minorities’. . . should neither obscure the unique experience of women of color, nor mask 
differences within and across racial and ethnic groups.”  Rhode, supra note 11, at 1042.  On 
the challenging experience of women of color at BigLaw, see JANET E. GANS-EPNER, ABA 
COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY:  WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW 
FIRMS 25 (2006). See generally Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law: Black Women Lawyers’ 
Struggle for Advancement, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777; Joan C. Williams, Double 
Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and 
Intersectionality, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 185 (2014). 
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their fourth year, exiting the firm and going in-house is often a prudent 
career move because they stand a lesser chance of making partner.14 
Indeed, close scrutiny reveals the inherently different, and often lesser, 
outcomes typically achieved by women and minority lawyers compared to 
their Caucasian male counterparts.  First, BigLaw partner is a coveted 
position of power and influence, often leading to a demanding, yet 
relatively stable, lucrative, and prestigious career path.  A departing fourth 
year associate, in contrast, is likely to join an in-house department as 
associate general counsel or as a subject matter expert—an increasingly 
sought after position yet one not usually on par with that of a BigLaw 
partner or of general counsel.15  Second, Caucasian males who choose to 
stay at BigLaw and make partner are as equally well-positioned as their 
women of color counterparts to go in-house if they so desire.  Female 
minority associates, however, hardly have the same choices.  Irrespective of 
whether they opt out or are pushed out of BigLaw, they do so facing 
different circumstances:  they go in-house without having the realistic 
option of staying put and making partner, and they leave the firm endowed 
with less training and mentorship and having experienced a lower quality of 
work. 
What explains these markedly different stories?  That is, what explains 
the systematic underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in 
positions of power and influence at BigLaw?  The existing literature 
conceives of large law firms as tournaments of lawyers, in which associates 
exchange their labor for salaries, work assignments, training, and 
mentoring, and where they compete based on merit for promotion to the 
partnership, irrespective of their gender, race, and other facets of their 
personal identity.  However, prevailing societal stereotypes and implicit 
bias disproportionately impact diverse BigLaw lawyers, leading to fewer 
and lower quality assignments, subpar training, compromised mentorships, 
and, in turn, diminished likelihood of promotion.16 
The traditional account suggests that the underrepresentation of diverse 
attorneys at BigLaw is the result of exogenous societal forces mostly 
outside the control of BigLaw and its lawyers, and therefore offers a bleak 
forecast for greater representation of women and lawyers of color at 
BigLaw, at least until the demise of negative stereotypes and implicit bias 
in American society.  Indeed, this grim analysis appears to find support in 
BigLaw’s two-decade-long unsuccessful attempt to enhance diversity 
among its upper ranks, as well as in the diversity fatigue phenomenon.17 
This Article advances a new capital analysis, depicting BigLaw 
relationships not as basic labor-salary exchanges but rather as complex 
transactions in which BigLaw and its lawyers exchange labor and various 
forms of capital—social, cultural, and identity.  Unlike the traditional 
 
 14. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers, supra note 7, at 580–82. 
 15. Eli Wald, The New Generalists (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. See Rhode, supra note 11, at 1257; Veronica Root, Retaining Color, 47 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 575, 587 (2014); Wald, supra note 11, at 1110–11. 
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Tournament Theory model,18 in which BigLaw and its lawyers come across 
as near hopeless pawns powerless to combat vicious exogenous societal 
forces outside of their control, the proposed capital model conceives of 
BigLaw and its lawyers as active players who are very much responsible for 
the outcomes of their exchanges.  Moreover, exactly because the capital 
model describes the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at BigLaw as an 
endogenous outcome within the control of BigLaw and its lawyers, it is, 
while far from rosy, a cautiously optimistic model that offers hope for 
greater representation of diverse lawyers in positions of power and 
influence. 
Part I of this Article offers a brief summary of the traditional account of 
the organization of BigLaw—Tournament Theory—and of the 
underrepresentation of diverse lawyers in positions of power and influence 
as result of stereotypes and implicit bias.  Part II introduces capital analysis, 
which builds on the work of Pierre Bourdieu regarding economic, cultural, 
and social capital.  It examines the concepts of positive and negative capital, 
explores the meaning of capital ownership by entities, and develops the 
notion of identity capital—the value individuals and institutions derive from 
their identities.  Part III presents a capital theory of BigLaw, in which large 
law firms and their lawyers engage in complex transactions trading labor, 
social, cultural, and identity capital for economic, social, cultural, and 
identity capital. 
Parts IV and V offer a new understanding of the underrepresentation of 
diverse lawyers at BigLaw and suggest effective, practical means of 
addressing it.  Part IV uses capital analysis to show that the 
underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers is not the result of 
exogenous forces but rather the outcome of the very exchanges in which 
BigLaw and its lawyers engage.  Part V suggests policies and procedures 
BigLaw can and should adopt to improve the quality of the exchanges it 
offers to women and minority attorneys and to reduce the 
underrepresentation of diverse lawyers within its ranks.  Employing the 
concepts of capital transparency, capital boundary, and capital 
infrastructure, Part V demonstrates how BigLaw can (1) explicitly 
recognize the roles social, cultural, and identity capital play in its retention 
and promotion apparatuses and (2) revise its policies and procedures to 
ensure that all of its lawyers have equal opportunities to develop the 
requisite capital and compete on equal and fair terms for positions of power 
and influence. 
I.   THE TOURNAMENT THEORY OF BIGLAW 
Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay’s seminal theory of large law firms 
postulates that partners and associates participate in a tournament of 
lawyers.19  Experienced partners need associates to help serve their clients 
 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991). 
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but fear that the associates may leave the firm, grab the clients, or shirk 
their responsibilities.  Associates need work and can offer their labor to 
partners but fear that the firm may not invest in their training and 
mentoring.  The tournament of lawyers effectively addresses these 
concerns:  associates receive high salaries in exchange for their long hours 
at the firm, which has an incentive to train and mentor its future partners; 
the promise of a well-compensated partnership diminishes the risk of 
associates leaving; and the eight-to-ten–year partnership track with its 
gradual increase in training, mentoring, and exposure to clients reduces the 
risk of grabbing and the uncertain promotion to partnership provides 
associates with incentives not to shirk.20  Tournament Theory is essentially 
one of a basic exchange:  associates trade labor (i.e., long billable hours) for 
a high salary, training, mentoring, and a shot at making partner.  At the 
conclusion of the tournament the hardest working, best associates are 
promoted to the partnership.21 
Over the years, Tournament Theory has been extended and refined.  
Galanter and William Henderson have argued that the tournament has 
become more elastic, by abandoning the “up or out” characteristic for 
associates and introducing new tracks for “permanent” associates and by 
recognizing new non-partnership tracks such as contract and staff attorneys.  
In turn, these changes have allowed law firms to reduce the number of 
entry-level associates and retain non-partner senior lawyers, resulting in a 
shift from a pyramid-shaped hiring and promotion structure to a diamond-
shaped structure.22  At the same time, law firms have also tiered up their 
partnerships by introducing tournament style competitions at the partner 
level, in which salaried or junior partners compete for the coveted positions 
of equity partners.23  Bernard Burk and David McGowan have explored the 
nature of the relationships among firm partners, arguing that reciprocal 
referrals render the ties among partners brittle and leave large law firms 
unstable and prone to departures and defections.24 
Tournament Theory sheds limited light on the varying experiences of 
different BigLaw associates and partners.  If Caucasian male associates 
 
 20. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists:  An 
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 313, 330–39 (1985). 
 21. Of course, under the traditional tournament model, even if an associate provided all 
the necessary labor and received training, mentoring, and good performance evaluations, 
promotion was not guaranteed.  Rather, the prize of promotion to the partnership was 
reserved for the best tournament performers, subject to the firm’s needs. 
 22. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 3, at 1875–78.  Nicholas Varchaver first 
described the changing structure of large law firms as diamond shaped in Diamonds Are This 
Firm’s Best Friend, AM. LAW., Dec. 1995, at 110. See also Noam Scheiber, The Last Days of 
Big Law, NEW REPUBLIC (July 21, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113941/big-
law-firms-trouble-when-money-dries. 
 23. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 3; see also William D. Henderson, An 
Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the AM Law 200, 84 N.C. L. 
REV. 1691 (2006); Catherine Rampell, At Well-Paying Law Firms, a Low-Paid Corner, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/24lawyers.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 24. Burk & McGowan, supra note 4, at 6. 
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work long hours, they will secure a stable flow of work.  Over time they 
will build relationships with senior associates and partners that will provide 
training and mentorships, which will result in higher quality assignments, in 
turn making them credible candidates for promotion to partner.  In contrast, 
if women and minority associates bill fewer hours due to their increased 
service commitments to the firm they:  (1) will gradually be assigned fewer 
and lower quality tasks, (2) will have diminished opportunities to benefit 
from training and mentoring, and (3) will be more likely to leave the firm 
sooner than their white male counterparts or accept positions as permanent 
associates.  Yet the tournament model fails to address some fundamental 
questions:  Why would law firms disproportionately burden women and 
minority associates with service commitments?  Why would these 
associates accept such impositions?  And should women and minority 
lawyers who do put in long billable hours expect to fare as well as their 
Caucasian counterparts?25 
Critical scholars have provided insightful answers to some of these 
questions.  David Wilkins and Mitu Gulati have challenged some of the 
admittedly simplistic assumptions of the basic Tournament Theory.  For 
example, while the firm as a whole has an incentive to train and mentor all 
its associates, individual partners face different incentives.  Once they 
invest in “their” associates, they have an incentive to see these associates 
succeed in the tournament and have others fail.26  Moreover, with increased 
pressure to bill at the expense of mentoring and training, partners will tend 
to prefer and promote those associates they perceive, correctly or 
incorrectly, to be more like them and therefore more likely to learn faster.27  
Such heuristics will tend to disfavor women and minority associates, who 
white male partners will often experience as different, even if they are 
capable and in fact doing high quality work.28  For some powerful white 
male partners, investment in “their” associates thus becomes a 
disproportionate commitment to support the career development of white 
male associates at the firm.  In turn, women and minority associates, 
correctly observing that they are receiving inferior training and mentoring, 
may decide to leave the firm or get off the partnership track in 
disproportionate numbers.29 
Many have documented the important role of stereotypes and implicit 
bias at the workplace.30  At BigLaw, gender stereotypes mean that male 
 
 25. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AM. BAR FOUND. & NALP FOUND., AFTER THE JD II:  
SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS 68 (2009) (finding that 
women lawyers at BigLaw generally bill as many hours as their male colleagues). 
 26. Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 7, at 1615–
19. 
 27. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers, supra note 7, at 569–70. 
 28. See, e.g., Kevin Woodson, Race and Rapport: Homophily and Racial Disadvantage 
in Large Law Firms, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2557, 2565–70 (2015). 
 29. Wilkins & Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers, supra note 7, at 569–70. 
 30. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, 
THE TIME BIND:  WHEN WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK (1997); JOAN 
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
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associates will benefit from the presumption that they are willing and able 
to work longer hours whereas female associates will be presumed to have 
divided loyalties—i.e., competing personal responsibilities to their 
families—and therefore less of a commitment to work long hours.31  Such 
stereotypes become a self-fulfilling prophecy:  partners who believe that 
female associates may be less dependable because of their presumed 
divided loyalties will tend to favor male associates and assign the latter 
more and better assignments.  Over time, female associates, receiving fewer 
and lower quality assignments, may fall behind their male counterparts and 
rationally decide to leave the firm, validating the divided loyalty stereotype 
in the eyes of these very partners.  Similarly, gender and racial stereotypes 
tend to favor Caucasian male associates whose work product is presumed to 
be competent, their mistakes understandable, and their work ethic 
unquestioned, whereas female and minority associates have to combat 
presumptions of incompetence and laziness.  Partners who rely on such 
stereotypes will tend to mentor and train those they identify as more 
competent, providing Caucasian men with enhanced opportunities to 
improve and become more competent than female and minority lawyers.32 
In addition to the impact of stereotypes and unequal training and 
mentoring, professional ideologies also tend to undermine the career 
trajectory of women and minority associates at BigLaw.  The rise in the 
prestige and power of in-house counsel and the increase in the number of 
large law firms mean that increasingly BigLaw cannot offer cutting edge 
intellectual work for elite clients and can only offer relatively high salaries 
in exchange for long billable hours.33  Large law firms, in their quest to 
maintain their elite status atop the profession in an increasingly competitive 
market for legal services that renders them less desirable workplaces, 
develop professional ideologies that define merit and excellence in terms of 
24/7 service to clients; thus they end up favoring white men and disfavoring 
 
ABOUT IT (2000).  For a survey of the literature, see Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the 
Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745 (2000) (reviewing WILLIAMS, supra).  On implicit bias, 
see Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Implicit Gender Bias in the Legal Profession:  An 
Empirical Study, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2010). 
 31. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions 
About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001) (exploring the impact of gender stereotypes on the development 
of child care policies at the workplace). 
 32. See ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA:  A 
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (2001); Russell G. Pearce, 
Eli Wald & Swethaa S. Ballakrishnen, Difference Blindness Vs. Bias Awareness:  Why Law 
Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships, 83 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2407, 2424–25 (2015); Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 39, 64–69 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 585, 587–94 (1996); cf. Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem:  Feminist 
Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1753–55 (1991). See generally 
PRESUMED INCOMPETENT:  THE INTERSECTIONS OF RACE AND CLASS FOR WOMEN IN 
ACADEMIA (Gabriella Gutiérrez y Muhs et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter PRESUMED 
INCOMPETENT]. 
 33. David B. Wilkins, Partner, Shmartner!  EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 1264, 1276–77 (2007). 
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women and minority lawyers who face negative stereotyping about their 
24/7 commitment and their excellence.34 
These accounts—first generation critical analyses of BigLaw—tend to 
explain the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers at BigLaw 
in a manner consistent with Tournament Theory.  At the same time, the 
accounts portray law firms, partners, and associates in a positive—or at 
least forgiving—light, in that all parties to the exchange appear to act 
without intention or explicit control over the circumstances that lead to 
systematically different outcomes for minority lawyers.35  Law firms, for 
example, may argue that gender and racial stereotypes are a product of 
American culture and that they have little ability to influence them even if 
their practices accommodate them; that partners’ training and mentoring 
decisions are grounded in implicit biases that are hard to detect and uproot; 
and that increased competition in the market for legal services shapes and 
forms new professional ideologies that are outside of their control.36  
Partners may assert that, to the extent they act on stereotypes and implicit 
biases they have little control over or awareness of, they cannot be held 
accountable.  And associates may argue that they have little power but to 
play the hands they are dealt, which, in the case of female and minority 
associates, oftentimes means leaving the firm disproportionately early.  The 
accounts suggest a lamentable status quo with little hope for change in the 
future.37 
Put differently, first generation critical analyses successfully show that 
BigLaw’s tournaments do not produce the results predicted by the 
tournament model—namely, the hardworking best being promoted to 
partnership.  Or, more accurately, they produce a particular subset of the 
hardworking best—white males.  However, importantly, the analyses imply 
that the problem is not with the theory but rather with reality:  because 
BigLaw and its actors, in real life, experience exogenous conditions that 
feature implicit bias and stereotypes, their tournaments produce white male 
partners disproportionately.  Consequently, reducing the 
underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in positions of power 
may require a change in the external conditions—implicit bias, stereotypes, 
and dominant white culture—which cause it. 
Recent scholarship—which may be thought of as second generation 
critical analyses of BigLaw—has begun to challenge the inevitability of 
these accounts.  Devon Carbado and Gulati have shown that law firms do 
not simply accept “as is” their lawyers’ increasingly diverse identities but in 
 
 34. Wald, supra note 12, at 2256. 
 35. Tiffani N. Darden, The Law Firm Caste System:  Constructing a Bridge Between 
Workplace Equity Theory and the Institutional Analysis of Bias in Corporate Law Firms, 30 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85 (2009); Note, “Trading Action for Access”:  The Myth of 
Meritocracy and the Failure to Remedy Structural Discrimination, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2156, 
2172–74 (2008). 
 36. Cf. Root, supra note 17. 
 37. See generally Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass 
Ceiling?  The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597 
(2011). 
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fact actively shape and form the ways in which firm lawyers work their 
identities.38  Nancy Leong has argued that law firms disproportionately 
impose service commitments on minority lawyers because such “racial 
capitalism” allows BigLaw to derive diversity value by signaling to their 
clients, competitors, and recruits that they feature equal and culturally 
competent work environments.39  And Carbado and his colleagues have 
asserted that law firms tolerate, even accommodate, concealed biases in the 
workplace.40 
Second generation critical insights fatally undermine Tournament Theory 
and its notion of a basic exchange between associates and partners, 
suggesting that underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in 
powerful BigLaw positions is endogenous rather than exogenous.  Naive 
associates may believe that they are trading labor for a high salary, training, 
mentoring, and a shot at making partner.  Critical analyses establish, 
however, that large law firms and their partners do not simply trade high 
salaries, training, mentorship, and deferred compensation for labor, nor are 
they merely pawns who must operate within a complex system of cultural 
stereotypes and implicit biases over which they have little control and 
influence.  Rather, BigLaw actors engage in a much more complicated 
exchange, a capital exchange, best understood in terms of a capital theory 
of BigLaw.  A capital analysis of large law firms, however, requires a brief 
grounding in capital theory. 
II.   A BOURDIEUESQUE THEORY OF CAPITAL:  
SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND IDENTITY CAPITAL 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu interprets capital as a structure and 
function of the social world, a predictable resource yielding power—a 
deliberate, nonrandom, non-accidental regularity that cannot be reduced to 
mere economics.  Capital takes time to accumulate and has the “potential 
capacity to . . . reproduce itself in identical or expanded form.”41  Bourdieu 
distinguishes between three types of capital:  economic, cultural, and 
social.42 
Economic capital consists of economic resources such as cash and 
property.  Cultural capital is the accumulation or acquisition of 
“competence in society’s high-status culture.”43  A person possessing 
cultural capital benefits from the skills and knowledge that are afforded by 
 
 38. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 1, at 1299–1307. 
 39. Nancy Leong, Racial Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151 (2013). 
 40. Devon W. Carbado, Patrick Rock & Valerie Purdie-Vaughns, Concealed Biases 
(2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 41. See Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND 
RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241 (John G. Richardson ed., 1986). 
 42. Bourdieu discusses a fourth form of capital, symbolic capital, to refer to resources 
such as prestige, honor, and recognition within a culture. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, 
DISTINCTION:  A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 291 (Richard Nice trans., 
1984); see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Aristocracy of Culture, 2 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 
225 (1980) (discussing habitus or motivations and dispositions). 
 43. David Throsby, Cultural Capital, 23 J. CULTURAL ECON. 3, 4 (1999). 
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the culture that she has accumulated throughout her life.  Cultural capital 
includes communication skills, cultural awareness or sensitivity, knowledge 
of institutions, and the necessary credentials providing access to 
socioeconomic mobility.  An individual endowed with a great amount of 
cultural capital knows multiple languages, is well-read, and has an eye for 
art, an ear for music, and a palate for wine.  In this sense, cultural capital is 
a tool enabling a person to maneuver through social structures, gaining 
advantages and ultimately settling in a freely chosen place.44 
Social capital exists in the change and structure of relations between 
people.  Its value is the resource that relationships and connections can 
provide in the short and long term.  A person with social capital is a 
member of a durable network—whether it is a family, a religious group, a 
college alumni association, or an elite club—that extends to each of its 
members a benefit to which she is entitled by virtue of her membership in 
the group.  Social capital is measured by the extent to which an individual is 
a member of several networks and the amount of power, influence, money, 
and cultural capital the individual possesses by way of those networks.  A 
person with a large amount of social capital is a member of groups that 
have money, influence, prestige, and power, and the person may call on any 
of these things when desired.45  Capital analysis has become increasingly 
familiar to legal scholars.46 
 
 44. Id. at 4–6; see also Bourdieu, supra note 41, at 243–44. 
 45. Bourdieu, supra note 41, at 243; James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation 
of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. SOC. 95, 97–99 (Supp. 1988). See generally Paul S. Adler & 
Seok-Woo Kwon, Social Capital:  Prospects for a New Concept, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 17 
(2002).  Bourdieu has used the concepts of capital to argue that American thought 
systematically misrecognizes success as a personal and individual achievement based on 
merit. See Bourdieu, supra note 41, at 241–58.  Bourdieu believes that while a person’s 
achievements are in part the product of hard work and merit, they are also the product of a 
number of external factors that depend not exclusively on the person but rather on the culture 
in which she operates and, in particular, on the cultural and social capital with which she is 
endowed. See id.; see also Alejandro Portes, The Two Meanings of Social Capital, 15 SOC. F. 
1, 2 (2000) (remarking that Bourdieu believed cultural and social capital play a primary role 
in facilitating access to jobs, market tips, and other benefits). 
 46. Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth were among the first to explore Bourdieu’s ideas 
within the legal field, studying forms of private justice for international business disputes 
such as commercial arbitration. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN 
VIRTUE (1996).  Many others have followed in their footsteps. See, e.g., Lucille A. Jewel, 
Bourdieu and American Legal Education:  How Law Schools Reproduce Social 
Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1159–61, 1174 (2008); Lucille 
A. Jewel, Merit and Mobility:  A Progressive View of Class, Culture, and the Law, 43 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 239, 253–56, 269–70 (2012); see also James S. Coleman, The Creation and 
Destruction of Social Capital:  Implications for the Law, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 375, 382–84 (1988); Ronit Dinovitzer, Social Capital and Constraints on Legal 
Careers, 40 L. & SOC’Y REV. 445, 445–47 (2006); Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Building 
Trust:  Social Capital, Distributive Justice, and Loyalty to the Firm, 28 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 
483, 488–91 (2003). See generally JOHN HAGAN & FIONA KAY, GENDER IN PRACTICE:  A 
STUDY OF LAWYERS’ LIVES (1995); John Hagan et al., Cultural Capital, Gender, and the 
Structural Transformation of Legal Practice, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV. 239 (1991); Hilary 
Sommerlad, Minorities, Merit, and Misrecognition in the Globalized Profession, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2481 (2012). 
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Consider the following three extensions to Bourdieu.  First, capital may 
be either positive or negative.  Just as one may possess positive economic 
capital (such as wealth), positive social capital (such as relationships and 
networks that result in enhanced opportunities to accumulate wealth and 
status), and positive cultural capital (such as interests, hobbies, and skills 
that confer value), one can also possess negative capital.  Debt constitutes 
negative economic capital.  Destructive relationships—for example, with 
criminals who implicate one in illegal activities or with drug addicts who 
lead to harmful abuse—constitute negative social capital.  And harmful 
habits, hobbies, and skills, such as excessive drinking or gambling, are 
examples of negative cultural capital. 
To be clear, capital in and of itself is not a positive or a negative 
resource,47 yet it can be positive or negative, and the use of capital can 
result in positive or negative consequences.  Robert Putnam, for example, 
has observed that social capital “can be directed toward malevolent, 
antisocial purposes.”48  In Putnam’s formulation, what sets apart “positive 
and negative ‘social capital’ is whether it ‘bridges’ or ‘bonds.’”49  Bridging 
organizations result in positive consequences because they bring different 
people together, whereas bonding organizations lead to negative 
consequences because they connect similar people and breed exclusion.50  
In particular, while belonging to a bonding organization may confer 
positive consequences on its members, it may nonetheless cause great harm 
to those excluded.51 
Here, building on the work of Tracey Meares and others, negative capital 
means not only the possible negative consequences for some from the use 
of capital by others, but rather that capital itself can be negative and have 
negative consequences.  Meares argues not only that law-abiding minorities 
may realize that their fates are linked to those of law-breaking minorities,52 
but that minorities who have negative relationships with criminals and 
gangs may commit more crimes.53  Similarly, BigLaw associates who have 
bad mentors can have negative social capital and lawyers who receive poor 
training may have negative cultural capital. 
 
 47. Bourdieu, supra note 41; Dinovitzer, supra note 46, at 448. 
 48. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 22 (2001). 
 49. Corey Robin, Fragmented State, Pluralist Society:  How Liberal Institutions 
Promote Fear, 69 MO. L. REV. 1061, 1083 n.131 (internal citations omitted). 
 50. Id.; see also Susan D. Bennett, Creating a Client Consortium:  Building Social 
Capital, Bridging Structural Holes, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 67, 99 (2006). 
 51. As Stephanie Stern points out, “the fact that individuals living in segregated 
communities and likely participating in homogenous groups and organizations report more 
tolerance may prove little [to those excluded].” Stephanie M. Stern, The Dark Side of Town:  
The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property Law, 99 VA. L. REV. 811, 840 (2013). 
 52. Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 669, 682–83 (1998). 
 53. See TRACEY L. MEARES & DAN M. KAHAN, URGENT TIMES:  POLICING AND RIGHTS IN 
INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 13–14 (1999); Tracy L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and 
(Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 813 (1998). 
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Second, capital may be possessed by institutions and organizations.  That 
is, in addition to serving as the arenas in which individuals use capital,54 
institutions themselves can own capital.  It is understood that institutions as 
well as individuals may own economic capital, such as money.  Yet 
institutions may also own social and cultural capital.  For example, a law 
school’s relationships with its alumni, community, or peer institutions—or a 
law firm’s relationships with current and former lawyers, clients, judges, 
and opposing counsel—are forms of social capital, which importantly 
transcend relationships with individuals who act on behalf of the 
institutions.  Alumni, of course, interact with the Dean and the alumni 
office, but their relationships are fundamentally with the institution and not 
with its constituencies, which come and go.  Similarly, an institution’s 
reputation and credentials are a form of cultural capital,55 which build on 
but are distinct from the reputation and credentials of institutional actors.  
Law students, for example, may enroll in a particular law school given the 
reputation of some of its faculty members, but the law school’s reputation is 
distinct from that of its individual faculty members.  And while clients 
increasingly claim to hire individual lawyers and not large law firms, a 
firm’s reputation hardly ever depends on the reputation of particular 
partners.56 
Finally, in addition to economic, social, and cultural capital, individuals 
and institutions possess another form of capital:  identity capital.  Dr. Meg 
Jay has defined identity capital as a “collection of personal assets.  It is the 
repertoire of individual resources that we assemble over time.  These are the 
investments we make in ourselves, the things we do well enough, or long 
enough, that they become a part of who we are.”57  Dr. Jay’s broad 
definition of identity capital, akin to what some legal scholars have called 
human capital,58 is essentially a shorthand for social and cultural capital.59 
In contrast, I use identity capital to mean the values one derives from 
various facets of one’s personal identity—for example, gender, racial, 
ethnic, class, national, or sexual orientation identity—facets that trigger 
reactions, perceptions, and stereotypes in others.  Notably, some aspects of 
 
 54. PUTNAM, supra note 48, at 22–24, 350–63. 
 55. Or, more accurately, a form of symbolic-cultural capital. See BOURDIEU, supra note 
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Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1000 (2011) 
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departments, as well as individual members); Wilkins, supra note 9, at 2136. 
 57. MEG JAY, THE DEFINING DECADE:  WHY YOUR TWENTIES MATTER AND HOW TO 
MAKE THE MOST OF THEM NOW 6 (2012); Meg Jay:  Why 30 Is Not the New 20, TED, 
http://www.ted.com/talks/meg_jay_why_30_is_not_the_new_20 (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). 
 58. See, e.g., John M. Conley & Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business As Usual?  A 
Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 783 
(2005); Jo Dixon & Carroll Seron, Stratification in the Legal Profession:  Sex, Sector, and 
Salary, 29 L. & SOC’Y REV. 381 (1995). 
 59. Dr. Jay’s examples of identity capital—“degrees, jobs, test scores, and clubs,” as 
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cultural and social capital. JAY, supra note 57, at 6. 
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our identity are socially and legally constituted and construed and therefore 
outside of our control,60 whereas other aspects are a function of culture, 
identification, and personal investment and are, at least to some extent, 
within our control.61 
Only one other article has previously used the term identity capital.62  In 
some ways, E. Christi Cunningham’s definition of identity capital is similar 
to mine:  she defines identity markets as venues in which identities are 
bought and sold,63 contends that values derived from identity are traded as 
commodities in identity markets,64 that “[i]dentity commodification . . . 
involves the creation of value through labor beyond that which is necessary 
to sustain the person,”65 and concludes that “[t]hose who accumulate 
identity capital enjoy the benefits of enhanced identity value in the 
market.”66  In at least two ways, however, our definitions differ greatly.  
First, whereas Cunningham believes that “the process of commodifying and 
maintaining the commodification of identity requires both state force and 
private acts of discrimination,”67 I believe that informed and voluntary 
capital exchanges may take place between private actors, need not involve 
the state, and need not entail discrimination.  Second, whereas Cunningham 
argues that all “[t]rade in identity is a particular form of exploitation,”68 that 
the “labor expended in refining, negotiating, combating and preserving 
socially construed identity constitutes identity exploitation,”69 and therefore 
that “[identity] should not be commodified in identity markets,”70 I 
maintain that while capital transactions may be exploitative they need not 
be. 
 
 60. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:  FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 25 (Taylor & Francis e-Library 2002) (1990) (“[G]ender is always a doing, though 
not a doing by a subject who might be said to preexist the deed. . . .  There is no gender 
identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constituted by the 
very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its result.”); see also, e.g., Ariela J. Gross, Litigating 
Whiteness:  Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 
109 (1998); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on 
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1994); Nikki 
Khanna & Cathryn Johnson, Passing As Black:  Racial Identity Work Among Biracial 
Americans, 73 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 380 (2010) (discussing when and how biracial individuals 
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purchase jobs and relationships and other things we want,” then it is inclusive of my 
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to define her term. JAY, supra note 57, at 6–7. 
 61. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 1. 
 62. E. Christi Cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOW. L.J. 491 (2002). 
 63. Id. at 492. 
 64. Id. at 493. 
 65. Id. at 501. 
 66. Id. at 502. 
 67. Id. at 491. 
 68. Id. at 501. 
 69. Id. at 502. 
 70. Id. at 494. 
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In contrast with Cunningham’s, my proposed definition of identity 
capital builds on status expectation theory in sociology, which asserts that 
“the influence attempts of high-status individuals succeed, and those of 
lower-status people fail, due to socially shared cognitions and expectations 
that link social status to attributions about personal ability and worth.”71  
According to the theory, in group settings such as the workplace, group 
members “form expectations about the quality of each other’s contributions 
to an assigned task,”72 and these expectations, in turn, “generate the 
emergence of status hierarchies within group settings.”73  In such a way 
status, or identity capital, plays a role in constituting and maintaining a 
group’s social position and an individual’s position within the group and the 
workplace.74  Applying status expectation theory to the study of the legal 
profession and lawyers, Nancy Reichman and Joyce Sterling have argued 
that “employers will prefer one status group—male lawyers in the present 
instance—over another because they perceive them as more competent and 
worthy.”75  Moreover, “[t]he evaluation of . . . performance becomes a 
‘self-fulfilling prophesy’ when certain status actors (male lawyers) are 
given more opportunities to participate and to demonstrate their competence 
in the workplace,” resulting in employers interpreting “men’s performances 
to be superior to those of women.”76 
Just like economic, social, and cultural capital, identity capital is part of 
the structure and function of the social world that cannot be reduced to mere 
economics77—predictable resources yielding power, which capture and 
reflect deliberate, nonrandom, non-accidental regularity.  Gender capital, 
for example, a form of identity capital, denotes the value one derives from 
one’s gender identity, including stereotypes, associations, and perceptions 
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 75. Nancy Reichman & Joyce Sterling, Parenthood Status and Compensation in Law 
Practice, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1203, 1205–06 (2013) (internal citations omitted); 
see also Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap:  Reflections on 20 Years 
Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 515, 533–
34 (2013). 
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 77. Bourdieu, supra note 41, at 242 (“It is in fact impossible to account for the structure 
and functioning of the social world unless one reintroduces capital in all its forms and not 
solely in the one form recognized by economic theory.”). 
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of it.  Racial capital similarly reflects the value one derives from one’s 
racial identity.78 
A few examples demonstrate the meaning and relevance of identity 
capital in the practice of law.  The representation of the Ku Klux Klan by 
Anthony Griffin, a black lawyer,79 suggests that Mr. Griffin possessed 
various forms of capital.  The Klan hired Mr. Griffin both because he was a 
leading First Amendment attorney (cultural-symbolic capital) and because 
of his racial identity, wishing to build its organizational legitimacy and 
garner public sympathy through its association with a black lawyer (identity 
capital).  Put differently, Mr. Griffin was able to derive value from his racial 
identity in his representation of the Klan, in addition to deriving value from 
his professional merit and reputation.  Similarly, a Caucasian female 
defense counsel who agreed to represent a black defendant accused of 
raping a white victim is deriving value from her racial and gender 
identity.80 
While the terminology of identity capital may be new to legal scholars, 
its practice by lawyers and law firms dates back centuries.  Caucasian male 
lawyers have long utilized their gender and racial identity to take advantage 
of positive stereotypes of competence, intelligence, and loyalty to law firms 
and clients—forms of identity capital.81  And since the mid-twentieth 
century, Jewish lawyers have taken advantage of the flip side of bias, that 
is, from the surprisingly positive value of long-standing derogatory ethno-
religious stereotypes, such as “Jews are smart” and “manipulative,” to 
establish a perception that “everybody wants to have a Jewish attorney.”82 
The qualities of identity capital resemble those of the other forms of 
capital.  Specifically, identity capital, like economic, social, and cultural 
capital, may be either positive or negative.  For example, a Caucasian 
female associate who experiences negative gender stereotypes regarding her 
divided loyalties possesses negative identity capital.  Or an Asian American 
associate who faces unfair assumptions by partners that he lacks the 
creativity and imagination to become their peer possesses negative identity 
capital.83 
 
 78. Nancy Leong has similarly defined racial capital as “the economic and social value 
derived from an individual’s racial identity, whether by that individual, by other individuals, 
or by institutions,” adding that “racial capital is simply value derived from racial identity.” 
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 81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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46. 
 83. While some associates may benefit from the stereotype of Asian Americans as hard 
working, see Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:  Critical Race 
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1258, 1261–62 
(1993), others may experience a competing negative stereotype that Asian Americans lack 
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Indeed, the quality and quantity of one’s identity capital may sometimes 
be unclear.  A Latina associate who joins a large law firm may derive value 
from her gender and racial identity because the firm may hire her in part to 
pursue its diversity commitments, but she may experience negative 
stereotypes about her competence and commitment once at the firm.  The 
net effect of the associate’s identity capital may be less than evident.  
Similarly, a prospective black law student may derive value from his racial 
identity because a law school may admit him in part to pursue its diversity 
agenda, but once admitted, he may be harmed by racial stereotypes 
regarding his competence, even if affirmative action had nothing to do with 
his admission to the law school.84 
Finally, identity capital, like economic, social, and cultural capital, may 
be possessed by institutions as well as by individuals.  Large law firms have 
been pioneers of cultivating capital, from social capital through establishing 
strong institutional ties to elite law schools,85 to cultural and identity capital 
by building on their elite White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) and 
white-shoe credentials to develop elite professional status.  Indeed, as I 
have argued elsewhere, the rise of large WASP law firms to prominence in 
the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries very much depended 
 
the imagination and assertiveness which play an important role in the paradigm of a 
successful professional attorney, see Terri Yuh-lin Chen, Hate Violence As Border Patrol:  
An Asian American Theory of Hate Violence, 7 ASIAN L.J. 69, 85 (2000); Richard Delgado 
& Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture:  Can Free 
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1270–73 (1992) 
(describing negative stereotyping of Asian Americans in popular culture). See generally 
FRANK H. WU, YELLOW:  RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002). 
 84. JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE:  SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 229 
(2000) (arguing that affirmative action “creates private doubt,” depriving its recipients of 
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Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 856 (1997) 
(“Some critics of affirmative action argue that its pervasiveness has caused successful 
minorities to suffer a stigma:  the belief that minority achievements are the result of 
affirmative action, not individual merit.”).  In his autobiography, Justice Clarence Thomas 
described the process of his job search after law school as humiliating, having experienced 
the stigma and bias of affirmative action firsthand. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S 
SON:  A MEMOIR 86–87 (2007).  Others, however, have discounted the impact of stigma on 
recipients of affirmative action. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND 
WHITE:  AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 81 (1996) (“[A]ffirmative 
action has a cost . . . [and] part of the cost is the risk of stigma . . . [however,] the stigma 
[one] may suffer is a small price compared to the price I would pay if I faced closed 
doors . . . .”); Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust:  A Comment on the 
Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1331 (1986). See generally David B. 
Wilkins, Rollin’ on the River:  Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 527 (2000) (exploring network effects on the careers of black lawyers who were 
“rollin’ on the river” of the prestige benefits of elite institutions for many years after 
graduation). 
 85. ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO 
THE 1980S, at 51 (1983) (describing how from the beginning of the twentieth century, “the 
elite law schools were seen as increasingly bent on serving corporate law firms . . . .  The 
elite law schools grew alongside the burgeoning corporate law firms”); see also AUERBACH, 
supra note 2, at 28–30 (describing the symbiotic relationship between elite law schools and 
elite corporate law firms, matching the so-called “best” law students with the “best” law 
firms). 
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on their ability to translate their elite ethno-religious and class identity as 
WASP and white-shoe institutions into elite professional identity.86 
Some may raise a preliminary objection to more explicit capital trades, 
and, in particular, to identity capital, on the ground that such 
commodification is degrading to and disrespectful of identity.  To capital 
opponents, the answer to ongoing implicit capital exchanges is to disallow 
or discourage them rather than streamlining commodification of identity.87 
In an ideal world, one dramatically different than the one we live in, 
perhaps identity commodification might be avoidable.  One’s gender and 
racial identity, for example, would play no role in the workplace and would 
not be the subject matter of any explicit or implicit trades.  We do, however, 
inhabit a world in which our identities are routinely commodified, and such 
commodification may be inevitable:  in complex and important ways facets 
of our personal identity form and shape who we are as workers.88  To forbid 
identity commodification may amount to bleaching out workers’ identities 
and denying them the opportunity to be who they are as workers.  That is, 
insisting on separating professional and personal identity may harm and 
disempower workers.89 
Notably, the legal profession has long had, and continues to have, a 
thriving identity market, in which lawyers and law firms commodify and 
exchange identity capital.  Identity commodificaiton is not unique, and is 
not uniquely harmful to women and minority lawyers.  Rather, exactly 
because Caucasian male lawyers and WASP law firms have long traded and 
continue to trade in their identity, capital exchanges are inevitable.  In such 
a professional reality, what is needed is not the prohibition of identity 
markets but transparent and fair capital exchanges for all.90 
Moreover, trading in identity capital may not only be inevitable, it also 
may be desirable.  Consider prostitution—the commodification of the 
human body and of sexual relations—in which a prostitute exchanges use of 
her body and dignity for short-term economic capital.  Proponents of the 
legalization of prostitution advance two main arguments in support of their 
position.  First, autonomy and, in particular, the ability to control one’s 
body deserves respect and deference.  Accordingly, if an individual wishes 
to commodify her body, denying her the ability to do so by criminalizing 
the conduct is akin to denying her autonomy.91  Second, because our world 
 
 86. See generally Wald, Rise and Fall, supra note 82. 
 87. Cunningham, supra note 62, at 494; Leong, supra note 39. 
 88. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 89. This is not to deny the difference between empowering workers by allowing them a 
space in which to allow their personal identity to inform their professional identity and 
involuntary commodifying identity. 
 90. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Capitalize on Race and Invest in Justice, 126 
HARV. L. REV. F. 252 (2013). 
 91. See, e.g., Tracy M. Clements, Prostitution and the American Health Care System:  
Denying Access to a Group of Women in Need, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 49, 53–57 
(1996); Jody Freeman, The Feminist Debate Over Prostitution Reform:  Prostitutes’ Rights 
Groups, Radical Feminists, and the (Im)possibility of Consent, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
75, 89–90 (1990). 
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is not ideal, prostitution is going to take place.  While prostitution may be 
ideally undesirable, legalization is second best—if it is going to happen, 
prostitutes are going to be better served by commodifying their bodies 
under the law and its protection as opposed to operating in its shadows.  
Opponents retort that the harm from commodification of the human body 
outweighs its benefits because prostitution denigrates both the dignity of 
prostitutes and the dignity of all women.  In addition, they argue that 
prostitution is a poor banner on which to advance autonomy and freewill 
because it is only chosen under conditions of economic and cultural duress, 
suggesting that instead of legalization the state ought to improve the 
economic conditions that compel women to resort to prostitution.92 
Capital analysis sheds additional light on this discourse.  Prostitutes 
exchange use of their body for relatively little short-term economic capital, 
without receiving social and cultural capital or any prospect for long-term 
or future economic capital.  Moreover, the exchange endows prostitutes 
with negative social and cultural capital:  it may surround them with 
destructive, criminal relationships, diminish their self-esteem, and deny 
them the opportunity to develop skills and interests outside of prostitution.  
In an ideal world, prostitution would not occur.  In our nonideal world, 
however, legalization provides higher economic capital for prostitutes in the 
form of higher net earnings (e.g., owing a tax liability rather than exposure 
to an abusive pimp), as well as reduced health and safety risks.  It also 
promises the possibility of higher social and cultural capital:  legalization 
may reduce negative stereotypes and low self-esteem and at least diminish 
exposure to destructive harmful relationships if not access to more positive 
relationships. 
Capital discourse thus reveals several insights about commodificaiton.  
First, deference to autonomy suggests that individuals may commodify their 
property if they so desire; however, they ought to do so only if informed of 
the harm to themselves and to others from the loss of dignity.  Call this 
condition capital transparency, requiring that capital exchanges be 
informed both with regard to the exchanging individuals or institutions and 
to related and affected third parties. 
Second, while an important value, autonomy is not the only value at 
stake.  Commodification transactions may inflict great harm on the trading 
parties or on third parties or may be inherently unfair, in which case they 
ought to be highly regulated or even prohibited.  Consider the so-called 
market for babies.  Trading partners may wish to exchange a baby for 
economic capital and invoke their autonomy interest in being permitted to 
do so.  However, they are met with society’s legitimate interest in 
protecting children’s best interests and ensuring the fairness of the exchange 
process, resulting in a heavily regulated adoption process rather than an 
 
 92. See, e.g., Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root:  Prostitution and Feminist 
Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47, 106–07 (1992). See generally 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989). 
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outright marketplace for babies.93  Call this the capital boundary constraint, 
which prohibits inherently unjust exchanges or trades that cause significant 
harm to the parties and to third parties. 
Third, even when the capital boundary constraint does not prohibit 
exchanges outright, commodification requires close scrutiny of the 
conditions under which exchanges take place, with an eye toward duress 
conditions.  Autonomy considerations hardly can be advanced compellingly 
when parties to the exchange have no viable alternatives.  In particular, 
consider second-best arguments in favor of commodification:  even if 
legalized commodification in fact results in a superior exchange—one in 
which vulnerable trading parties may receive more economic, social, 
cultural, and identity capital for the commodity they give away—
commodification must also entail and the aspiration of building toward 
first-best outcomes.  Call this the capital infrastructure condition.  In the 
case of prostitution, for example, capital infrastructure means that even if 
legalization is permitted in the short run, society must work toward 
improving economic conditions for all to reduce the conditions of economic 
duress that drive individuals to commodify their own bodies. 
III.   A CAPITAL THEORY OF BIGLAW 
Using capital terminology, the Tournament Theory model can be 
described as one in which associates and law firms exchange labor for 
capital:  associates’ billable hours are labor for which firms offer three types 
of capital:  economic capital—a salary and deferred compensation in the 
form of promotion to the partnership; cultural capital—training; and social 
capital—mentoring.  A capital theory of BigLaw, however, reveals the 
limited and partial scope of Tournament Theory, describing the exchange 
more broadly as one in which associates trade labor and various forms of 
capital for various forms of capital. 
Contrary to the insights of Tournament Theory, associates offer not only 
their labor but also their cultural capital, such as their college and law 
school credentials, extracurricular activities and hobbies, and cultural 
competence.94  BigLaw not only relies on the cultural capital of law 
students to make its hiring decisions, it further commodifies the cultural 
capital of its lawyers to derive value from it, displaying and using the 
credentials to attract clients, recruit law students and lawyers laterally, and 
to build its own reputation.  Similarly, associates trade on their social 
capital, such as their relationships and networks, allowing law firms to 
make more informed hiring decisions and to utilize the capital vis-à-vis 
clients and other lawyers, for example, by using the alumni networks of its 
attorneys to recruit talent to the firm. 
 
 93. Compare Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby 
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), with Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, 
Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979). 
 94. More accurately, associates thus commodify both their cultural and symbolic capital. 
See supra note 42. 
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Moreover, associates also allow law firms to commodify aspects of their 
personal identity, including their gender and racial identity.  Enhanced 
diversity is a valuable asset that BigLaw pursues as well as cultivates.95  
The hiring of a Latina associate, for example, is valuable for the firm:  it 
gets to count the associate toward its gender and racial diversity numbers, 
data it collects and reports.  It gets to display the associate’s hiring publicly, 
to other lawyers at the firm, potential recruits, its competitors, clients, and 
the legal profession, deriving further value from the exchange.  And it gets 
to send a credible cultural message—“we are not a racist institution!”—both 
internally to its own lawyers and externally to potential recruits and clients.  
The law firm derives all this value by hiring the associate, strategically 
assigning her work with clients who value diversity, asking her to join its 
diversity and hiring committees, and prominently displaying her image on 
its website.96 
In return, in addition to giving associates short-term economic capital, 
i.e., a salary, law firms also provide associates with social and cultural 
capital, a shot at a lot more economic capital, and even identity capital.  
First, associates receive social capital in the form of mentoring from the 
firm’s senior associates and partners.  BigLaw’s primary asset is the people 
who work for it, and it attempts to recruit and retain the best lawyers 
available to remain competitive and retain its elite professional status.  
Upon joining the firm, associates gain access to these prized individuals, 
who become available to mentor the firm’s next generation.  Of course, 
ample literature documents the increased competition experienced by large 
law firms and the corresponding cultural transformation that makes their 
lawyers less willing and able to mentor junior associates.97  Nonetheless, 
associates do find mentors at BigLaw, a significant social capital asset.98 
Moreover, BigLaw lends and allows associates (and partners) access to 
valuable relationships, to its high achievers and their networks, not only 
within but also outside of the firm.  Firm partners, for example, sit on high 
profile boards of for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and are well-
connected within the profession and with other professionals, connections 
some may gradually share with interested associates.  Next, the firm 
gradually exposes associates to its social capital, as opposed to the social 
capital of its individual members, for example, to high status entity clients 
with whom associates may be able to build relationships that may in term 
 
 95. Cf. SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE:  HOW THE POWER OF DIVERSITY CREATES 
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be leveraged for in-house positions, as well as to its relationships with 
financial institutions and real estate agencies. 
Mentorship is correctly identified in contemporary literature as an 
important ingredient of lawyers’ professional success in and outside 
BigLaw.99  Trying to make partner in a large law firm without securing and 
benefiting from the guidance and power of mentors is ill-advised.100  
Capital analysis reveals that social capital means so much more:  an 
associate (or junior partner) who fails to cultivate mentors or is discouraged 
or prevented by the firm from securing powerful mentors not only stands a 
lessor chance of making partner (or getting promoted to equity partner 
status) but also fails to understand or is prevented from taking advantage of 
the very bargain she struck with the firm.  A constitutive feature of the 
exchange is the opportunity given to the firm’s attorneys to cultivate and 
build their own social and cultural capital by utilizing the firm’s resources.  
Failure to take advantage of this opportunity deprives oneself of valuable 
experiences that are inherent in the exchange with BigLaw.  It essentially 
amounts to shortchanging oneself of fundamental aspects (and benefits) of 
the transaction into which one entered.  For example, a senior associate who 
does not take advantage of the firm’s connections to join a board of trustees 
or become publically active in an area of interest is not only diminishing her 
chances of making partner but also passing on an opportunity to form 
valuable and enriching relationships outside of the firm that may generate 
professional value, as well as equally important personal value and growth.  
At the same time, failure by the firm to extend all of its lawyers meaningful 
opportunities to develop their capital violates the very exchange the firm 
entered into. 
Second, associates receive cultural capital from the firm in the form of 
training, enhanced valuable skills, and credentials.101  At the firm, 
associates learn to draft, think, and practice at the highest professional level, 
honing the skills that set the stage for promotion within the firm or 
advancement outside of it.  To the astute observer, the firm offers valuable 
lessons in how to serve and interact with the most powerful clients and 
power brokers.102  Firms also provide exposure to high status skills and 
interests that may serve associates well, such as offering tickets to high 
culture events and high status sports events, sponsoring wine tasting, and 
providing opportunities to learn to play golf.  The mere affiliation with 
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BigLaw and its credentials opens doors and legitimizes associates’ status 
and professional standing. 
As is the case with social capital, failure to cultivate one’s cultural capital 
while at the firm undercuts the value of the transaction between lawyer and 
firm beyond merely diminishing the prospects of making partner at the 
firm.  The value of the firm’s reputation and credentials, as well as the skills 
one may acquire while practicing within it, may be worth a tremendous 
amount to one’s professional and personal flourishing, irrespective of 
whether one makes partner and chooses to stay with the firm in the long 
run.  One, for example, may develop enriching interests or develop people 
skills that may be pursued outside of the professional realm.  Failure to 
acquire and cultivate cultural capital while at the firm cheats firm lawyers 
out of the very opportunities that are an integral part of the exchange they 
have agreed to.  But, of course, firm lawyers only can take advantage of 
opportunities actually afforded them.  To the extent that the firm fails to 
offer all of its lawyers meaningful opportunities to cultivate their cultural 
capital, it is breaching the terms of its capital exchange. 
Third, associates receive a shot at enhanced long-term economic value, 
either in the form of a partnership103 or other leveraged positions outside of 
the firm, such as coveted in-house positions.104  Finally, to the extent that 
BigLaw still consists of predominantly masculine white institutions,105 as 
part of the exchange they provide associates and partners with identity 
capital.  Large law firms are well-endowed with and derive benefits from 
their gender and racial identity:  they are presumed to be competent, 
efficient, and possess a high level of expertise well worth their high fees.106  
A lawyer hired by the firm benefits from these perceptions and the positive 
stereotypes associated with them.107 
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Capital analysis of the exchange between BigLaw, its partners, and its 
associates corrects for a significant omission of Tournament Theory.  The 
tournament model impliedly assumed that the rules of the tournament, that 
is, how to compete in it—how to be a successful lawyer at a large law 
firm—were obvious and meritocratic.  It led scholars adhering to it to 
assume that BigLaw institutional discrimination, if any, was nothing more 
than a reflection of external conditions in American society over which 
large law firms had little to no control.  First generation critical scholars 
have shown that the tournament rules were neither obvious to all nor solely 
meritocratic, but they failed to specifically document how BigLaw’s 
policies, procedures, and culture cause, rather than simply reflect, bias.  
Capital analysis, in contrast, provides the missing insights about the rules of 
the tournament and their consequences. 
Success at BigLaw requires more than hard work and meritocracy.  To be 
sure, success certainly requires hard work—i.e., labor as well as merit—to 
develop excellent skills as a lawyer and as a business developer.  But 
success at BigLaw also requires the development and utilization of social, 
cultural, and identity capital.  Winning the tournaments of lawyers—both as 
an associate competing for partnership and, increasingly, as a salary partner 
competing for equity status—requires cultivating and deploying networks 
of relationships, a sophisticated appreciation of the operation and culture of 
the firm and its power dynamics, and a willingness to take advantage of 
facets of one’s personal identity.  In short, success at BigLaw is a function 
of hard work, merit, and capital. 
Indeed, the relationship between meritocracy and capital is a complex 
one.  On the one hand, capital can help build merit when an associate uses 
her skills, training, and mentorship to become a better attorney.  On the 
other hand, capital may also be misrecognized as merit, e.g., when a partner 
confuses an associate’s nuanced understanding of the culture of the firm or 
her connections as expertise.  As a result, positive capital helps propel firm 
lawyers within the firm whereas negative capital undermines success.108 
To make matters even more complicated, certain qualities of capital 
make it hard to distinguish from merit.  First, different lawyers and law 
firms will have capital in varying forms and amounts, and these different 
capital endowments significantly impact career prospects at BigLaw.  The 
point, to be clear, is not merely that some lawyers will have more capital 
than others.  Rather, varying capital endowments impact performance and 
its perception at BigLaw. 
Consider an incoming associate whose social capital endowment includes 
having BigLaw lawyers in his networks.  The associate may leverage his 
social capital to cultivate cultural capital assets—specifically, a 
sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the workings of BigLaw in 
advance of and while working at the firm:  how to help secure better and 
high quality assignments, how to interact with partners, senior associates 
and staff at the firm, how to read subtle messages and meet informal 
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expectations, and how to carry oneself consistent with firm culture by 
anticipating and addressing unspoken prevailing stereotypes.  In turn, such 
cultural capital assets allow the associate to actually perform better and 
visibly be perceived as performing better than his counterparts. 
BigLaw ought to be keenly aware of the varying capital endowments of 
its attorneys.  While it has long relied on capital endowments to recruit and 
retain lawyers as well as attract clients, and while it has ample incentives to 
continue to take advantage of its lawyers’ capital, it also has an incentive to 
ensure that it recruits and retains the best, that is, the most meritorious 
lawyers and that it does not misrecognize capital for merit.  Put differently, 
that different lawyers possess varying capital endowments is natural.  
BigLaw ought to record and track its lawyers’ capital endowments so it can 
better support them, take advantage of them, and avoid misrecognizing 
them as merit.109 
Second, acquiring positive capital, dispensing with negative capital, and 
generally deploying capital may be costly for firm lawyers, and the costs of 
utilizing capital may vary.  Sometimes, the costs of deploying capital are 
negligible.  A law school graduate applying for a BigLaw associate position 
incurs no cost utilizing her cultural and symbolic capital assets by listing 
her law school, grade point average, and class rank on her resume.  A 
lawyer looking to move laterally and who is taking advantage of her 
professional networks to identify and pursue appropriate opportunities is 
likely to incur relatively low costs taking advantage of her social capital 
assets, for example, by having to return the courtesy at some point in the 
future.  White male associates may incur no costs at all utilizing their 
identity capital to benefit from the positive racial and gender stereotypes of 
competence, intelligence, and loyalty to the firm and its clients. 
At other times, however, using capital may be quite costly, even risky.  
Following Wilkins and Gulati,110 as well as Gulati and Carbado,111 consider 
a black associate who is trying to dispense with negative identity capital 
stemming from negative racial stereotypes.  Determined to prove his merit 
and excellence, the associate may assume risk by taking on a high profile 
assignment he is not quite ready to handle.  Or a female associate battling 
negative identity capital stemming from negative gender stereotypes of 
divided loyalties may overextend herself in the hopes of proving her loyalty 
to the firm. 
Or consider the varying degrees of risk incurred by different associates 
seeking to cultivate social capital.  On the one hand, a Caucasian male 
associate likely incurs relatively little risk approaching what he perceives to 
be potential mentors among the many Caucasian male partners at the firm, 
or a Jewish lawyer is likely treading on safe ground seeking the mentorship 
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of Jewish partners by implicitly trading on her ethno-religious identity 
capital.  On the other hand, a Caucasian female associate who approaches a 
female partner seeking work and mentorship hoping to take advantage of 
her gender identity, or a black male associate who similarly approaches a 
black partner, is likely to incur higher degrees of risk.  The female partner 
may resent the assumption that she ought to mentor a female associate and 
may believe that the female associate ought to seek male partners as she 
herself had to do years before.112  Or the black partner may not be the best 
mentor for the black associate, for example, because he lacks power and 
influence within the firm.113  Moreover, even if the female and black 
partners, respectively, are willing and able to mentor the associates, such 
acquisition of social capital may simultaneously entail acquiring negative 
identity capital deriving from gender and racial stereotypes regarding why 
these partners were willing to mentor the associates. 
The point is that BigLaw should not rush to judgments regarding its 
lawyers’ ability to cultivate and deploy their capital.  While the 
development and use of capital by lawyers is imperative for their and 
BigLaw’s success, different lawyers may reasonably be hesitant to deploy 
their capital endowments and may incur varying costs in doing so.  
Accordingly, BigLaw ought not to quickly draw negative inferences or 
penalize lawyers for failure to cultivate and utilize capital.  Instead, it ought 
to develop policies that encourage capital buildup and decrease the costs of 
deploying capital within the firm. 
Finally, different lawyers may have varying amounts of control over the 
use and value of their capital endowments.  Partner A who is asked by 
Partner B to help facilitate B’s lateral move in-house at Corporation X can 
choose whether to call X’s General Counsel and controls what and how to 
recommend the colleague.  As importantly, not only does A control the 
amount of capital he is willing to spend, he also controls the value of the 
social capital exchanged by assessing the qualifications of B by gauging the 
response of the General Counsel.  Consider in contrast a diverse associate 
who is asked to serve on a diversity committee.  The associate may have a 
say over the number of hours she is going to serve on the committee, but 
she will have no control over the value of her identity capital used because 
she has no control over how the firm values diversity or how it values her 
participation and service on the committee.114  Moreover, different lawyers 
may have varying amounts of control over their capital.  For example, 
identity capital is the value one derives from one’s identity, including when 
one agrees to trade identity capital to the firm for some other forms of 
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capital.  But, importantly, a law firm may be deriving value from one’s 
identity even when the lawyer in question derives no value at all, either 
because the exchange is involuntary or when it is unfair.  A case in point is 
the posting of a minority lawyer’s image on the firm’s website.  Unless the 
firm exchanges something of value for the usage, it is benefiting from the 
commodification of lawyer’s identity capital while the lawyer derives no 
value from it. 
As was the case with the varying costs of cultivating and deploying 
various forms of capital, BigLaw ought to put in place policies and 
procedures that are sensitive to the varying degrees of control its lawyers 
exercise over the use and value of their forms of capital and avoid 
erroneous judgments regarding the use of capital by different lawyers. 
IV.   A NEW CAPITAL ACCOUNT OF UNDERREPRESENTATION IN BIGLAW 
Is the complex capital exchange, however, inherently unfair to women 
and minority associates (and partners), at least compared and contrasted 
with the exchange BigLaw makes with white male associates? 
A.   Capital and Underrepresentation in BigLaw 
Unlike Tournament Theory, capital analysis can make sense of BigLaw’s 
hiring, promotion, and retention policies.  Tournament Theory assumes that 
BigLaw would recruit and then promote the most talented entry-level 
associates irrespective of their personal identity.  Therefore, it cannot 
explain the de facto affirmative action recruiting policies of BigLaw.  And 
it concludes either that external conditions beyond BigLaw’s control cause 
the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in positions of 
power and influence, or that these lawyers are not as meritorious as the 
tournament’s winners. 
To begin with, capital analysis explains why BigLaw actively recruits 
women and minority associates.  Diversity is a value BigLaw pursues,115 
and it can reap benefits from the gender and racial identity of its lawyers by 
leveraging their identity capital.  Of course, diversity is not the only goal 
BigLaw pursues.  It seeks diverse candidates with gender and racial 
identities as well as meritorious candidates to meet its goals of providing 
quality service and maintaining its elite professional status.  Yet BigLaw’s 
appetite for identity capital explains why it actively seeks to recruit women 
and minority lawyers.   
After recruiting diverse candidates, BigLaw has an incentive to retain its 
diverse lawyers so it can—in addition to benefiting from their work 
product—continue to take advantage of their gender and racial identities.  
Importantly, however, BigLaw faces two countervailing forces that 
undermine its diversity efforts and result in the underrepresentation of 
women and minority lawyers in its partnership ranks. 
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First, because distinguishing merit from capital is both costly and hard to 
do, BigLaw tends to overplay the role of the former and downplay the 
latter, without attempting to avoid misrecognizing the two.  As a result, firm 
lawyers who are well-endowed with capital systematically outperform those 
with less capital, both because they use their enhanced capital to become 
more meritorious and because their capital is misrecognized as merit.  
Because white male lawyers tend to possess significantly greater 
endowments of social, cultural, and identity capital compared with their 
women and minority counterparts, they end up disproportionately 
represented in the partnership ranks. 
For example, to the extent that some BigLaw diverse candidates possess 
negative identity capital—e.g., gender and racial identities rendered 
negative by prevailing stereotypes—they underperform (negative capital 
undermines merit) and are unfairly perceived as underperforming even 
when they are not (negative capital is misrecognized as lack of merit).  This 
capital impact, in turn, will reduce their opportunities to become better 
lawyers and to cultivate their social capital (mentoring) and cultural capital 
(training).  Firm lawyers endowed with negative capital thus face an uphill 
retention and promotion battle at BigLaw.116 
Second, and worse, the very processes by which BigLaw extracts value 
from its lawyers’ gender and racial identities tend to undermine the success 
of women and minority lawyers at the firm.  For example, by 
overburdening a Latina associate with service on the diversity and hiring 
committees, by expecting her to actively participate in firm events, and 
even by publicly displaying her image on its website, the firm distracts her 
and undermines her performance contrasted with her white male 
counterparts.  Hours that the Latina associate spends serving on committees 
and socializing, so she can be paraded and displayed by the firm, are hours 
that she does not bill—hours that white males can spend billing and getting 
ahead of her.  Indeed, even if a typical white male associate does not get 
ahead by billing more hours, he is able to spend overall fewer hours at firm 
related events, allowing him to relax and replenish his mental faculties at 
home, thereby giving him a better shot at outperforming the Latina 
associate when they both bill hours.  In the words of Carbado and Gulati, 
the Latina associate ends up working her identity longer and harder than her 
white male counterpart, with a very disturbing and real consequence—she 
falls behind the competition and may have a diminished chance at securing 
the richness of partnership down the road.117  And, as Nancy Leong points 
out, the Latina associate is not even offered higher pay for the extra service 
work she does.118 
Capital analysis thus suggests that the labor-capital exchange between 
BigLaw and its lawyers will tend to systematically disfavor women and 
minority lawyers both because the former tend to have lower endowments 
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of positive capital (or may even possess negative capital) and because 
firms’ own policies of extracting identity capital from diverse lawyers 
undermine their prospects of retention and promotion. 
A counterargument might be that everybody works their identity, such 
that while diverse candidates experience an imposition when BigLaw 
commodifies their identity capital, other lawyers will experience a similar 
hardship when firms commodify their respective identities.  For example, 
Caucasian female associates who are mothers of young children are 
expected to display loyalty to the firm and its clients by being available 
24/7.  At the same time, they are celebrated and featured by the firm as 
proof that the firm is sensitive to work-life concerns and often burdened 
with diversity and recruitment service expectations.119  Associates who hail 
from lower socioeconomic status or who are graduates of lower ranked law 
schools may experience negative stereotypes and expectations that they 
conform to the culture of the firm, while at the same time are used to 
demonstrate the firm’s commitment to egalitarianism and meritocracy.120 
To be sure, even white male associates work their identity.  Not only may 
they be called upon to demonstrate to other white male associates that the 
firm is the kind of place whereby notwithstanding its commitment to 
diversity, white males are welcomed and can succeed, but they are also used 
to show clients that the firm has the people power to serve their needs 
24/7.121  More fundamentally, while male associates work their identity by 
benefiting from positive gender and racial stereotyping.  They are often 
presumed to be competent and committed to the firm, even if in reality 
some may prefer to spend more time with their families.  Indeed, Caucasian 
males even benefit (i.e., “what a committed father,” “what a supportive 
husband”) when they seek the very work-life accommodations that trigger 
negative reactions for their female counterparts (“her commitment to her 
family and children undermines her loyalty to the firm”). 
The point, as Carbado and Gulati explain, is that while everybody works 
their identity, some systematically work harder; some can work their 
identities to their advantage, and others must work their identities simply to 
overcome negative stereotypes.122  That everybody works their identity is 
therefore not a reassuring observation; rather, it is a reflection of the very 
inequalities and hurdles which BigLaw may not uniquely inflict but which 
it certainly features.  The Latina associate, it would seem, is at an inherent 
disadvantage compared to her white male counterpart:  while she exchanges 
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labor for short-term economic capital like all other associates, she 
exchanges greater amounts of identity capital and receives less in return in 
terms of social and cultural capital.  Fundamentally then, the core root of 
minority underrepresentation in positions of power and influence at BigLaw 
appears to boil down to this:  while white male associates essentially get to 
exchange their labor for relatively low economic capital in the present (a 
salary) and a shot at cultural, social, and high economic capital in the future, 
female and minority associates exchange their labor as well as identity 
capital for relatively low economic capital in the present. 
B.   The Capital Obligation and the Capital Opportunity 
If the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in the 
partnership ranks of BigLaw were solely the result of different firm lawyers 
possessing different endowments of social, cultural, and identity capital, 
compounded by the inability of large law firms to easily distinguish merit 
from capital, BigLaw might have been somewhat justified in claiming it is 
not responsible for remedying the situation. 
However, because the underrepresentation of women and minority 
lawyers in positions of power and influence is also the result of BigLaw’s 
commodificaiton of these lawyers’ (indeed, of all of its lawyers’) identity 
capital, BigLaw has an obligation to remedy the problem.  To commodify 
the gender and racial identity of its lawyers and to derive benefit from it 
only to disclaim responsibility for remedying the underrepresentation and 
inequality the commodificaiton causes is inherently unfair and inexcusable.  
Indeed, such commodificaiton violates the boundary constraint on capital 
exchanges and renders BigLaw culpable.  As long as large law firms engage 
in exchanges with lawyers and choose to commodify their identity capital, 
they are obligated to address the consequences of their exchange—the 
underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in their partnership 
ranks—by practicing capital transparency and offering all of their lawyers 
equal opportunities to build their capital infrastructure.123 
Worse, failure to practice capital transparency and afford all of its 
lawyers equal opportunities to cultivate the capital necessary for success 
constitutes capital exploitation of women and minority lawyers.  Consider 
the following revolving door diversity dynamic at large law firms:  BigLaw 
hires a certain number of entry-level women and minority lawyers but does 
not offer them meaningful opportunities to acquire social (mentoring) and 
cultural (training) capital.  As a result, women and minority lawyers 
disproportionally exit BigLaw as junior attorneys, never reaching the ranks 
of senior associates and partners.  Yet, by the time these lawyers leave, a 
fresh crop of entry-level women and minority lawyers are hired by BigLaw, 
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such that at any given point in time large law firms feature ample supply of 
diversity, if only in their bottom ranks.  Such a revolving door diversity 
dynamic, unintentional as it may be, allows BigLaw to derive value from 
the capital identity of women and minority lawyers while offering little 
social and cultural capital in return.  In capital analysis terms, such 
exploitative exchange gravely violates the boundary constraint, that is, basic 
conditions of fairness.124 
Fortunately, recent developments in BigLaw’s practice render living up 
to its capital obligation easier than in the past, by turning instances of 
identity capital commodificaiton into opportunities of social and cultural 
capital buildup.  Increased competitive pressures experienced by large law 
firms’ attorneys—both externally by clients who vocally refuse to pay for 
training and mentoring125 and internally by partners who feel that they 
cannot afford to spend the time doing it—reduce opportunities for training 
and mentoring at BigLaw for associates.126  In this context, attendance at 
firmwide events and service on various committees, diversity and hiring 
committees included, may provide associates valuable opportunities to form 
relationships with powerful partners at the firm—the very prized 
networking windows and mentoring moments that are otherwise a 
diminished commodity at BigLaw.127  Service on the hiring committee, for 
example, may allow associates to get to know the powerful hiring partner as 
well as department and practice group heads, and service on the diversity 
committee may provide associates the opportunity to form relationships 
with firm leaders, such as members of the management committee.  Such 
service impositions may also provide the Latina associate with 
opportunities to get to know the firm culture better, that is, allowing her to 
acquire and cultivate valuable cultural capital.  In short, service 
commitments, which constitute an imposition on an associate’s time, are at 
the same time increasingly rare opportunities to cultivate social and cultural 
capital within the firm. 
Moreover, BigLaw’s commitment to diversity—the very driver that 
causes firms to commodify the Latina associate’s gender and racial identity 
and at times results in negative stereotypes while with the firm—may 
provide her with enhanced opportunities to obtain and leverage social and 
cultural capital.  If BigLaw practiced capital transparency, the Latina 
associate may be able to demand and negotiate for marginally better terms 
of employment when hired, and she may be able to take a visible lead when 
burdened with service commitments (for example, while playing a 
leadership role in a diversity event). 
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This analysis by no means is meant to deny the imposition on and harm 
to diverse lawyers when BigLaw commodifies their gender and racial 
identities.  Yet at the same time, the processes and policies by which 
BigLaw extracts identity capital from its diverse lawyers provide them with 
increasingly rare opportunities to cultivate their social capital by building 
mentorship relationships with powerful partners.  These relationships allow 
them to build their cultural capital, to receive training from powerful 
partners, and to better understand the firm’s culture and inner workings.  At 
the same time, these relationship help to dispose of negative identity capital 
stemming from negative gender and racial stereotypes by disproving them 
with excellent service. 
Yet the opportunities for diverse lawyers to turn firm policies that extract 
their identity capital into arenas in which to build positive social and 
cultural capital are fraught with risk.128  Service on a diversity or a hiring 
committee, for example, is less than ideal terrain on which to build 
relationships with powerful partners, some of whom may not eagerly serve 
on it, or do so dismissively without any intention to use the joint service 
with diverse lawyers as a mentorship platform.  Arguably, these are exactly 
the kinds of committees on which women and minority lawyers are likely to 
face powerful incentives to work their identities so as not to be perceived by 
powerful partners as troublemakers.  Accordingly, to make capital 
opportunities viable, BigLaw must meet two conditions:  It needs to better 
understand the meaning and qualities of firm capital and, in particular, of 
the capital of its lawyers.  It also needs to institute capital policies and 
procedures that increase the likelihood of equality within its ranks.  
Otherwise, BigLaw risks systematically engaging in exploitative capital 
exchanges that allow it to derive value from the gender and racial identities 
of its lawyers while depriving and denying its lawyers the fair value of the 
bargains. 
V.   CAPITAL AND EQUALITY AT BIGLAW 
BigLaw may continue to commodify the identity capital of its lawyers as 
part of its capital exchange with them, as long as it practices capital 
transparency, respects the capital boundary constraint, and invests in 
building capital infrastructure for all of its lawyers.  Because its 
commodification of identity capital contributes to inequity within its ranks, 
BigLaw is accountable and must remedy the underrepresentation of women 
and minority lawyers.  This part explores transparent and fair policies and 
procedures meant to reduce the underrepresentation of diverse lawyers at 
BigLaw.  But first, it addresses a preliminary objection that BigLaw ought 
not engage or promote capital trades because such commodification 
contradicts the legal profession’s commitment to pursuing a universal 
professional identity 
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A.   Identity Capital and Lawyers’ Professional Identity 
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
their predecessors have long advocated a one-size-fits-all professional 
identity for lawyers, lending support to capital opponents who reject the 
streamlining of trades in capital identity.129  In particular, the Rules aspire 
to promote a universal identity that is explicitly professional rather than 
personal.  All lawyers are expected to be competent, diligent, and loyal to 
clients, irrespective of their personal identity.  Indeed, one’s identity based 
on gender, race, class, sexual orientation, et cetera is irrelevant under the 
Rules in that it is never explicitly acknowledged and hardly even implicitly 
recognized.130  The Rules’ universal, professional, one-size-fits-all 
approach has an intuitive appeal.  It celebrates merit (competence, 
diligence, and loyalty) above all else and promotes equality by treating all 
lawyers similarly, irrespective of “irrelevant” personal traits and 
considerations.  Indeed, for the Rules to acknowledge and permit 
differential treatment of lawyers based on facets of their personal identity 
smacks of dreaded explicit discrimination.131 
But, of course, the Rules are not truly divorced from so-called 
“irrelevant” non-merit value judgments.  They are historically grounded in 
and culturally embedded in the identity of the legal profession’s founding 
members—white men.  They continue to be interpreted from the 
perspective of the profession’s most dominant members—white men.132  
Moreover, even if ideal Rules could devise a regulatory framework that is 
in some meaningful ways truly universal—and what that would mean is a 
separate complex and controversial question—lawyers are increasingly 
diverse in ways that could and should inform their professional identity and 
exercise of professional judgment.  Put differently, even if a particular 
brand of universal professionalism were possible, it would, to quote 
Wilkins, at the same time be a form of “bleached-out” professionalism, 
ignoring important, even constitutive, aspects of lawyers’ personal 
identity.133  Universal professionalism, with its commitment to competence, 
diligence, and loyalty, captures important, indeed, constitutive 
commitments of lawyers qua lawyers and plays an indispensable role in the 
definition of what it means to be a lawyer.  But it does not start and end the 
professionalism conversation, nor does it negate the fact that lawyers’ 
personal identities shape their professional identities. 
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When the Latina associate joins a large law firm, certain aspects of the 
commodified exchange between them are not inevitable.  The firm need 
not, of course, prominently feature the associate on its website and it need 
not expect her to disproportionately serve on various committees or work 
for certain clients.  Yet, other aspects of the commodification are much 
harder to avoid.  As soon as the Latina associate joins the firm, certain 
assumptions will be made by various actors, and some stereotypes will be 
triggered:  lawyers and clients will make assumptions about why the 
associate was hired, her competence and performance, and the law firm’s 
commitment to diversity and its culture. 
In an ideal world, perhaps such inevitable commodification might be 
avoided:  the Latina associate would not experience negative gender and 
racial stereotypes, and her white male counterparts would not benefit from 
positive gender and racial stereotypes.  But even in such a world, the Latina 
associate would still be more than a generic universal associate.  In addition 
to being a competent, diligent, and loyal lawyer, she also brings to the table 
her background, upbringing, and cultural values.  She is a woman and a 
Latina, and these features of her identity inform her professional identity as 
a lawyer in ways that are inevitable.134 
BigLaw’s trading in capital identity cannot and should not be avoided.  In 
fact, ignoring implicit capital exchanges in a reality in which diverse 
attorneys tend to possess lower (not to mention negative) capital 
endowments compared with Caucasian male lawyers and in which capital 
both helps build merit and professional success and gets misrecognized for 
merit is irresponsible and unfair.  Instead, BigLaw must explicitly recognize 
the role of capital in exchanges with its lawyers and in its culture and 
institute policies and procedures that ensure an equal playing field for all of 
its lawyers. 
B.   Using Capital to Enhance Equality at BigLaw 
The underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers in positions of 
power and influence at BigLaw is in part explained by their relatively low 
(or even negative) endowments of capital compared with their Caucasian 
male counterparts, by the tendency of BigLaw to misrecognize capital with 
merit, and by its adoption of purportedly universal policies and procedures 
of retention and promotion that implicitly build on lawyers’ capital 
endowments and therefore disproportionately disfavor women and minority 
attorneys.  To level the playing field, namely by providing all its attorneys 
with equal opportunities to acquire and deploy their capital and thus 
compete for retention and promotion, BigLaw must develop explicit capital 
policies. 
In particular, turning impositions and hurdles disproportionately 
experienced by women and lawyers of color into opportunities to cultivate 
social and cultural capital depends in part on both the lawyers’ and firm’s 
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willingness to treat them as such—these are opportunities to acquire capital, 
not guarantees of it.  An individual partner would have to appreciate the 
role capital plays in BigLaw’s tournament of lawyers and invest valuable 
time in mentoring and training firm lawyers assigned to him or her.  An 
individual associate would have to seize the opportunities and make the 
most of them:  work hard to showcase her commitment to the firm, its 
clients, and the task at hand; go above and beyond the call of duty, 
notwithstanding the real imposition on billable hours; and use the service 
platform to actively pursue relationships with powerful partners as mentors.  
Other firm lawyers, for example, colleagues of the associate benefiting from 
the mentorship and training, will have to support the mentorship.  BigLaw, 
for its part, would have to staff its hiring and diversity committees with 
powerful partners and stress to them the institutional value their service, 
including interacting with the associates who serve on them.  And it must 
establish policies that visibly identify and credibly acknowledge—even 
reward—service as a valuable aspect of BigLaw practice on par with the 
billable hour. 
1.   Capital Transparency 
The capital boundary constraint, that is, basic fairness considerations 
inherent to capital transactions, requires transparency, such that parties to 
identity capital exchanges are aware of the exchange and its impact on 
themselves and others.  But unlike some explicit exchanges, capitalizing 
identity often does not entail a conscious transaction and its consequences 
are sometimes unclear.  To be sure, sometimes the exchange is relatively 
obvious.  When the Ku Klux Klan retained Mr. Griffin to represent it in a 
First Amendment case, there could be little doubt that the representation 
entailed a commodification of Mr. Griffin’s racial identity, and that Mr. 
Griffin understood or should have reasonably understood the nature of the 
exchange.135  And when Kobe Bryant, a superstar black male basketball 
player, retained Pamela Mackey, a leading Caucasian female defense 
attorney, to defend him against rape allegations, the representation 
commodified Ms. Mackey’s gender and racial identity.136  Yet at other 
times, for example, when a large law firm hires a Latina associate, the 
identity commodification exchange may be less apparent.  Practicing capital 
transparency will ensure that BigLaw and its lawyers are aware of the 
exchange and the consequences it entails. 
If law firms are going to hire and promote associates in part because of 
their gender and racial identity (as they always have), they ought to be 
honest and transparent about their practices.  Of course, BigLaw has long 
had a history of hiring and promoting based on gender and racial 
considerations, hiring and promoting near exclusively WASP males and 
allowing such lawyers to benefit from presumptions of competence and 
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loyalty to the firm and its clients.  Yet BigLaw often did so while confusing 
and misrecognizing social, cultural, and identity capital as merit.  
Historically, large law firms recruited, based on merit, top-ranked graduates 
of elite law schools with law review credentials.  At the same time, the 
hiring and promotion were exclusive to those candidates endowed with 
connections and who also had elite hobbies and spoke additional 
languages—a misrecognition of merit and capital.137  Thus, BigLaw was, 
and still is, commodifying the (male) gender identity and (white) racial 
identity of its lawyers.  Moving forward, law firms must take steps to better 
monitor the misrecognition of capital as merit because failure to do so 
favors those who have higher capital endowments.  For example, white 
male lawyers’ mistakes are played down and more easily overlooked when 
these lawyers are endowed with significant social and cultural capital, 
undermining law firms’ commitment to retaining and promoting the best 
lawyers.  Similarly, if law firms are going to continue their practice of 
recruiting and promoting based in part on capital endowments, they must 
guard against misrecognizing identity capital as lack of merit.138  This is not 
just a question of basic fairness to the Latina associate (and indeed to all 
firm lawyers) but rather also implicates BigLaw’s commitment to 
meritocracy. 
Lack of transparency about capital exchanges, for example, about firms’ 
recruitment of minorities, breeds negative stereotyping and therefore 
negative identity capital.  Absent transparency, when BigLaw actively 
recruits minority candidates, some of its partners and associates may 
speculate and make negative assumptions about the competence of the 
minority lawyers.  To the extent that some firm partners and associates may 
operate under such assumptions, the firm must institute policies and 
procedures to combat the impact of such negative stereotyping.139  Being 
endowed with identity capital that enhances the law firm’s diversity profile 
does not mean, and cannot be allowed to mean, that the Latina associate is 
less qualified than her counterparts.  Instead, BigLaw must transparently 
explain its reasons for recruiting diverse lawyers and take active steps, after 
the hiring stage, to ensure fair treatment of all of its lawyers, and, in 
particular, that no lawyers suffer from negative stereotyping, 
disproportionately endowing its minority lawyers with negative capital. 
Of course, the law firm must ensure that it is living up to its part of the 
exchange.  Specifically, it must put in place policies and procedures that 
would provide the associate with the promised opportunities to cultivate her 
social and cultural capital.  For example, if the law firm is going to burden 
the associate with service on the diversity and hiring committees, expect the 
associate to visibly attend functions and conform to its dominant culture, 
and display the associate’s image on its website to demonstrate its 
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commitment to diversity, it must at the same time make sure that the 
associate’s commitments and service to the firm are recognized and valued, 
and it must ensure that powerful partners serve on the diversity and hiring 
committees and that they are willing to invest time and effort in mentoring 
and training the associate. 
For her part, the Latina associate must be made aware of the exchange 
BigLaw is offering:  economic capital, opportunities to cultivate her social 
and cultural capital, as well as benefitting from the law firm’s identity 
capital, in return for the Latina associate’s labor and identity capital.  Once 
the terms of the exchange become transparent, the Latina associate would 
then be able to consider the dignity harm to her personal identity—as well 
as to minority communities’—resulting from the commodification of her 
identity. 
Indeed, transparency would not only allow women and minority lawyers 
to trade identity capital on an informed basis, it has the potential to 
empower them to refuse to do so.  Assume that the Latina associate does 
not wish to trade her racial and gender capital.  She does not want to be 
featured in the law firm’s diversity publications and events and does not 
want to serve on its diversity and recruitment committees.  Absent 
transparency, how will the Latina associate go about communicating her 
preferences?  Capital transparency might provide the language and the 
context for the Latina associate to express her preferences to the firm. 
Moreover, transparency is a necessary step toward equalizing the playing 
field—the tournament—for all BigLaw lawyers and, specifically, breaking 
away from dynamics that render gender and racial inequality a problem 
only for women and minority attorneys.  Absent transparency, a powerful 
white male partner might come to think about diversity as a women’s issue, 
such that, for example, when a prospective female associate asks about 
gender realities at the firm, he might respond:  “I do not know, but I’ll put 
you in touch with my partner Jane Smith who can better address the issue.”  
Or he might feel justified in refusing to personally commit significant time 
to serving on the diversity committee or women’s committee on the ground 
that gender diversity is not a priority for him.  Capital transparency 
establishes, in contrast, that diversity is a firm issue and a firmwide 
commitment.  If the firm trades in identity capital and benefits from it, it is 
the duty of all of its members to see that the firm lives up to its part of the 
capital exchange. 
Similarly, absent transparency, a white male associate might be tempted 
to think about service on the recruitment committee or attending a diversity 
event as a low priority that does not directly involve and affect him.  And 
he might even come to resent diversity policies and procedures, 
understanding them as unfair to him.  Yet transparency serves as a reminder 
not only that the firm benefits from commodifying identity capital, but also 
that the white male associate himself benefits from possessing positive 
identity capital.  Viewed from this perspective, diversity policies are not an 
unfair impediment, but rather a necessary condition to ensure that all firm 
lawyers compete on equal terms and footing. 
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In sum, the point here is not that BigLaw is responsible for prevalent 
gender and racial stereotypes in American society, nor is it that BigLaw is 
responsible for varying endowments of capital among the lawyers it 
recruits.  Rather, it is that BigLaw is responsible for the cultivation and use 
of capital by its lawyers when it chooses to value and trade in their capital.  
It is simply unfair for BigLaw to hire diverse lawyers intending to take 
advantage of their positive identity capital only to ignore their negative 
identity capital and allow it to undermine their prospects of retention and 
promotion by, for example, failing to combat negative gender and racial 
stereotypes among its partners.  And it is unfair for BigLaw to allow white 
male lawyers to benefit from positive identity capital while putting in place 
policies and procedures that disproportionately impose on women and 
minorities, while at the same time claiming to be a meritorious institution in 
which capital is an irrelevant consideration for success. 
Admittedly, practicing capital transparency “in a time and age when the 
American public, especially white Americans, are uncomfortable talking 
about race,”140 may be easier said than done.  As Angela Onwuachi-Willig 
points out, “[I]t is much easier to point to non-complaining minorities as 
rational and discount complaining minorities as ultrasensitive or, as the 
saying goes, of ‘playing the race card.’”141  Yet the likely discomfort to all 
parties involved and impacted by capital exchanges notwithstanding, 
BigLaw must discontinue its misleading and unfair practice of implicit 
capital exchanges and ensure that all of its lawyers are well informed about 
the nature and role of capital in their workplace and professional lives. 
2.   Capital Boundary 
The harm resulting from identity commodification depends in part on the 
conditions of the exchange and its circumstances.  The capital boundary 
restraint requires that identity capital exchanges take place under fair 
conditions.  In the BigLaw context, it suggests that large law firms ought to 
abandon their long commitment to equal treatment of their lawyers and 
practice instead equal opportunity, exactly because firm lawyers vastly vary 
in terms of their capital endowments.  Consider the assignment of both 
office space and work to lawyers at the firm.  Equal treatment suggests that 
office assignments should be solely handled based on subject-matter fit, 
availability, and seniority.  When an office space becomes available, for 
example, on a litigation floor, it should be assigned to a litigator with 
seniority and ongoing working relationships with other members of the 
litigation department.  Work assignments must be distributed randomly 
within departments to ensure equal treatment of all associates within the 
departments.  Any consideration of identity has long been understood to 
violate equal treatment.  And indeed, when explicit discrimination was the 
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evil fought by large law firms, such equal treatment, or difference 
blindness, was a necessary and appropriate approach.142  But equal 
treatment becomes an impediment to equality in today’s practice realities in 
which implicit bias and varying capital endowments are the cause of 
inequality. 
Office assignments distribute social capital.  Physical proximity to 
partners with power is a relevant consideration in determining who ends up 
working with these partners.  If a law firm’s success is determined in part 
by possession of social capital, and if endowments of social capital vary 
among firm lawyers, then equality requires ensuring access to social capital 
and assigning offices in part to benefit firm lawyers who have fewer social 
capital assets, traditionally women and minorities.  Similarly, the 
assignment of work ought to take into account capital endowments.  Savvy 
firm lawyers, well-endowed with cultural capital, who understand the 
importance of and actively seek work from powerful partners, already have 
an advantage vis-à-vis counterparts who possess fewer cultural capital 
assets.  Assigning work randomly pursuant to equal treatment principles 
will therefore tend to perpetuate unfair capital inequality.  Instead, BigLaw 
should practice equal opportunity and assign work in a manner that 
provides its lawyers who have fewer cultural capital assets access to its 
powerful partners.143 
BigLaw’s formal adherence to policies and procedures of equal 
treatment, purportedly holding all of its lawyers to the same standards of 
merit and professionalism—for example, the billable hour,144 demonstrable 
and visible loyalty to the firm and its clients,145 and the development of a 
book of business146—is inaccurate and misleading in ways that 
disproportionately burden and harm women and minority lawyers.147  Merit 
and professionalism, at the risk of stating the obvious, are of course 
constitutive aspects of large law firms’ practice.  But they are not (and have 
never been) the only relevant considerations, because capital endowments, 
including identity capital, have long mattered to BigLaw and continue to 
matter today, albeit in changing ways.  As importantly, merit and 
professionalism are not (and have never been) divorced from capital 
(whether social, cultural, or identity).  Thus, BigLaw’s practice of equal 
treatment based on merit and professionalism standards that ignores the 
social, cultural, and identity capital endowments of its lawyers is 
 
 142. Pearce, Wald & Ballakrishnen, supra note 32. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby, supra note 8; Stuart L. Pardau, Bill, Baby, Bill:  
How the Billable Hour Emerged As the Primary Method of Attorney Fee Generation and 
Why Early Reports of Its Demise May Be Greatly Exaggerated, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 145. Wald, supra note 34, at 2272. 
 146. Lawrence J. Fox, The End of Partnerships, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245, 248 (2005). 
 147. Ronit Dinovitzer et al., The Differential Valuation of Women’s Work:  A New Look 
at the Gender Gap in Lawyers’ Incomes, 88 SOC. FORCES 819 (2009); Sterling & Reichman, 
supra note 75; Wald, supra note 11. 
2015] BIGLAW IDENTITY CAPITAL 2549 
misleading and unfair, in a way that imposes great and disproportionate 
harm on women and minority lawyers.148 
Instead, BigLaw ought to develop standards and policies for hiring and 
promotion, work assignments, office space allocation, measurement of 
productivity and performance, and business development, as well as an 
overall culture that embodies equal opportunities for all of its attorneys by 
utilizing criteria that recognize merit and capital contributions to the firm 
and that are sensitive to the interplay of merit and capital to avoid 
measuring the former in terms that disproportionately disfavor women and 
minority lawyers. For example, capital transparency and capital boundary 
analysis suggest that BigLaw ought to develop policies and procedures to 
honestly and accurately evaluate the performance of its lawyers, for 
example, by replacing bland assessment tools with competency-based 
performance analyses,149 rather than relying heavily on billable hours.150  
BigLaw must also recognize the various contributions different lawyers 
bring to the firm.  Expecting diverse candidates to disproportionately serve 
on the diversity and hiring committees, for example, only meets fairness 
requirements if BigLaw is willing to recognize the value of this service on 
terms equal to billable hours.  At a minimum, transparency and fairness 
require that if BigLaw refuses to acknowledge service as the billable hour 
equal, then it must advise its lawyers accordingly and allow diverse lawyers 
to make informed decisions as to whether to agree to undertake significant 
service commitments. 
Similarly, while there is nothing wrong with a for-profit large law firm 
expecting and measuring its senior associates’ and partners’ ability to 
develop lucrative books of business, there is an inherent unfairness in 
turning a blind eye to lawyers’ varying endowments of social and cultural 
capital.  This, in turn, plays a significant role in one’s ability to develop a 
book of business.  Rather than measuring only the number of clients 
brought to the firm and the revenue generated from them, BigLaw ought to 
develop equal opportunity criteria that take into account its lawyers’ capital 
endowments and measure their books of business in light of their ability to 
use and deploy capital.  For example, BigLaw ought to allow all of its 
lawyers opportunities to cultivate the very social and cultural capital 
necessary for the development of a book of business and then measure their 
success relative to their capital endowments. 
Abandoning equal treatment and replacing it with equal opportunity 
principles is not going to be an easy undertaking.  Indeed, figuring out what 
a commitment to equal opportunity means in particular situations may be 
easier said than done.  Consider mentorship pairings.  A law firm 
committed to replacing difference blindness (for example, the random 
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pairing of partners and associates) with bias awareness might pair a 
minority associate with a minority partner or a woman associate with a 
woman partner in an attempt to take into account the likely affinity of firm 
lawyers based on their respective identities.  Yet capital analysis cautions 
against simplistic conclusions regarding identity.  First, while affinity is a 
relevant consideration in cultivating social capital, in the context of BigLaw 
access to powerful partners is by far the most dominant element of social 
and cultural capital.  Therefore, a law firm committed to principles of equal 
opportunity should pair mentors and mentees based on access-to-capital 
considerations.  Associates endowed with relatively low social and cultural 
capital assets should be paired up with powerful partners, even if that means 
pairing up a Latina associate with a white male partner.  Second, pairing 
mentors and mentees by affinity risks overburdening the few minority and 
women partners thus undermining their own cultivation of social and 
cultural capital.  Instead, equal opportunity principles suggest broadening 
the ranks of mentors to include powerful white male partners to spread the 
burden of mentorships more equally across BigLaw. 
Moreover, BigLaw should abandon the practice of assigning mentors in a 
manner divorced from its core training activities and work assignments.  In 
an increasingly competitive work environment, isolated mentoring is bound 
to result in busy partners failing to mentor or nominally and minimally 
“mentoring” associates by meeting with them twice a year for a quick cup 
of coffee.  Instead, to help build the social and cultural capital of mentees, 
mentors should be drawn from within the pool of powerful partners while 
working with and training their mentees.  Such an equal opportunity 
practice does not violate BigLaw’s commitment to equality:  associates 
well-endowed with social and cultural capital will be able to deploy their 
capital assets to secure mentorships and work opportunities without 
receiving institutional assistance from the firm.  Moreover, white male 
associates will often be able to use identity capital assets to further secure 
powerful mentors.  Equality in BigLaw, therefore, requires an equal 
opportunity approach to embedded training and mentorship to ensure all 
firm lawyers equal opportunities to acquire and develop capital 
infrastructure. 
The capital boundary restraint demands that capital exchanges take place 
on fair conditions.  Given the role of capital in achieving success at 
BigLaw, fairness requires that large law firms offer all of their lawyers 
equal opportunities to acquire and develop capital and forsake equal 
treatment principles, which albeit unintentionally, tend to reflect and sustain 
unequal capital endowments and therefore, ultimately, inequality. 
3.   Capital Infrastructure 
Capital infrastructure considerations suggest at least two conditions on 
the commodification of lawyers’ identity at BigLaw.  First, while BigLaw 
trades in and takes advantage of the racial and gender identity of some of its 
lawyers in a nonideal, second-best professional world to demonstrate its 
commitment to diversity and equality, and trades in and takes advantage of 
2015] BIGLAW IDENTITY CAPITAL 2551 
the racial and gender identity of all if its lawyers (white male lawyers 
included), it must at the same time build a capital infrastructure that offers 
all of its lawyers equal opportunities to succeed, and that would one day 
change the very gender and racial perceptions that lead to these identity 
exchanges.  Specifically, firms must help women and minority lawyers 
build their social and cultural capital endowments while taking advantage 
of their identity capital; that is, they must consciously provide mentoring, 
training, and business development opportunities so that, over time, women 
and minority lawyers have an equal opportunity to grow and succeed at 
BigLaw and outside of it. 
Put differently, if BigLaw is to acknowledge the influence of different 
forms of capital on merit and commit itself to affording all its lawyers equal 
opportunities for success, it must offer all of its lawyers meaningful 
opportunities to improve their merit and cultivate their respective capital 
endowments, recognizing that different lawyers possess different capital 
endowments and therefore may need different opportunities to cultivate and 
deploy their capital.  Those well-endowed with social and cultural capital, 
as well as identity capital, may need fewer opportunities to cultivate these 
assets, whereas those with lesser endowments may require additional 
opportunities to build the forms of capital essential for success at large law 
firms. 
Building capital infrastructure for all of its lawyers in a way that satisfies 
the capital boundary restraint, namely in a fair and just manner, is not going 
to be easy.  Recall the example of the large law firm that expects and asks a 
Latina associate to serve on its hiring and diversity committees and attend 
firm functions, in which her gender and racial identity may be leveraged by 
the firm.  The firm may be tempted to ensure the equal treatment of the 
associate by adopting a policy that would acknowledge the associate’s 
service hours and put them on par with other associates’ billable hours.  
Yet, while such a policy would satisfy the boundary restraint, it would fail 
the infrastructure condition:  in the short run, if the Latina associate is 
allowed to count her service hours as billable hours, she will not fall behind 
her colleagues and will meet her billable expectancies.  However, in the 
long run, the policy may prove to be harmful to the associate.  Over time, 
associates who have billed more hours to quality work assignments as 
opposed to service would likely be able to improve their skills as lawyers 
and cultivate a mentoring relationship with their supervising partners.  
Thus, the Latina associate, even if she could count her service hours as 
billable hours or, in the alternative, receive additional payment for her 
service to the firm,151 would be at a disadvantage.  In hindsight, the Latina 
associate would have been better off spending less time on service and more 
time billing hours and cultivating her social and cultural capital.  Capital 
transparency would require the firm to advise the associate in advance of 
the likely consequences of undertaking significant service commitments 
even if she can count them toward her billable expectancy.  And capital 
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infrastructure considerations suggest that the firm should advise the 
associate in advance and assist her, over time, to avoid undertaking 
imposing service commitments and instead focus on cultivating her social 
and cultural assets. That is, exchanging identity capital for economic 
capital, for example, doing service work in exchange for a bonus, while 
tempting in the short run, may prove ill-advised in the long run:  service 
commitments that are used as a platform to build one’s social and cultural 
capital assets are conducive to making partner whereas time-consuming 
service commitments that stifle cultivation of cultural and social capital are 
not, even if one is being paid for them. 
Moreover, even if the firm were committed to allowing the associate to 
take advantage of her imposing service commitments (by leveraging them 
into opportunities for building her social and cultural capital and by 
advising and incentivizing partners on the diversity and hiring committees 
to serve as the associate’s mentors), transparency and boundary 
considerations require that the firm caution the associate in advance about 
the risks inherent in service to allow her to make an informed decision as to 
whether she should serve and risk falling behind her counterparts at the 
firm. 
Second, mindful of the fact that personal identity components inform the 
identities of lawyers as professionals, BigLaw must invest in fostering an 
inclusive culture that recognizes, welcomes, and values the diversity of its 
lawyers.152  Consider the following example.  On a Monday morning, 
Client calls male Partner and seeks advice in negotiating a transaction “as 
soon as possible.”  Perhaps Client is correct regarding the timing of the 
legal assistance it requires.  Any delay on the part of the law firm in doing 
the work may foil the transaction and undermine Partner’s relationship with 
Client.  In such an instance, a 24/7 attitude would be required on the part of 
Partner and his team of lawyers, irrespective of the gender identity of team 
members and irrespective of the fact that such an attitude may 
disproportionately burden female lawyers, either because some tend to 
shoulder heavier personal burdens outside of the firm compared to their 
male lawyer counterparts, or because Partner may assume they shoulder 
such burdens and will be less available to serve Client’s needs on a 24/7 
basis, even when they do not. 
At other times, however, Client may be mistaken about the urgency of its 
needs or may not care about timing.  It is in these moments that the culture 
of the firm and its commitment to a gender-diverse environment may come 
into play.  Partner may still, in response to Client’s request for assistance 
“as soon as possible,” promise Client a prompt reply and trigger a 24/7 
attitude, either because Client asked for it or because the male partner is 
used to or even prides himself on being able to provide a prompt reply.  
Indeed, if the firm tends to define merit and excellence in part in terms of 
24/7 service to clients, Partner may instinctively promise a quick turnover, 
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notwithstanding the uneven gender impositions on male and female team 
members. 
A partner mindful and concerned with fostering a more gender-equal 
culture at the firm may, on the other hand, promise Client advice by the end 
of the week, allowing his team members an opportunity to do the work 
during the usual nine-to-five timeframe as opposed to during evenings or 
nights.  Such seemingly subtle client management and case management 
strategies may go a long way toward establishing and building an inclusive 
gender culture at the firm, especially when done explicitly and 
transparently, empowering female team members and credibly conveying 
that the firm respects excellence and merit in terms other than 24/7 service. 
BigLaw is currently recruiting diverse entry-level classes of associates.  
However, because different lawyers will tend to have different endowments 
of capital when joining the firm, attention to capital infrastructure requires 
tracking lawyers’ various capital endowments early on.153  Tracking capital 
would allow BigLaw, in turn, to offer its lawyers equal opportunities to 
acquire and develop capital within the firm, for example, by assigning 
associates with low social and cultural capital to strategic office locations 
by powerful partners, assigning them work with powerful partners early on 
and continuously, and pairing them to powerful mentors within the firm. 
Attention to capital infrastructure, to reiterate, does not mean that 
BigLaw should abandon its long-standing reliance on the billable hour as a 
key factor in assessing the productivity of associates and its reliance on the 
book of business as a key aspect of assessing partners and their 
compensation.  Given, however, that both the billable hour and the book of 
business are influenced by the capital endowments of firm lawyers, it does 
mean that BigLaw should develop additional means to assess the quality 
and productivity of associates alongside the billable hour and ensure fair 
access to (quality) billable hours by providing access to powerful and busy 
partners to those lawyers endowed with low capital assets.154  Similarly, 
while encouraging and expecting firm partners to develop significant books 
of business is both legitimate and desirable, BigLaw must provide all of its 
lawyers equal opportunities to develop such portfolios.  Relevant policies 
may include pairing powerful rainmaking partners with associates and 
partners endowed with little capital, as well as providing explicit training on 
how to develop business to all firm lawyers, while especially targeting 
lawyers with low social and cultural capital assets. 
Finally, a word about the dominance of the 24/7 professional ideology 
and its hallmarks of undivided loyalty to the firm and its clients.  Especially 
in an increasingly competitive market for corporate legal services, large law 
firms are expected to feature, and need to practice, a client-centered 
approach.  Sometimes, such an approach requires the provision of legal 
services around the clock.  Yet large law firms have developed their elite 
reputation and status by offering more than around-the-clock service 
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commitment.  They offer high quality services and products.  Ready 
availability, while important, has never been and should not become the 
litmus test for excellence and professional merit.  The 24/7 approach as the 
defining feature of loyalty to clients does not serve the interests of either 
clients or large law firms, and it undermines BigLaw’s commitment to 
equality by disproportionately endowing women and minority lawyers with 
negative capital.  Indeed, devising capital-minded policies and procedures 
may not only allow BigLaw to more effectively pursue equality within its 
upper ranks, it may also open the door to the development of professional 
ideologies—alternatives to the dominant yet unappealing around the clock 
client-centered ideology—that would allow large law firms to continue to 
successfully recruit top talent and retain their elite status atop the 
profession.155 
CONCLUSION 
BigLaw is at a loss to meet its purported commitment to enhanced 
diversity and equality within its upper ranks.  Its defenders claim that large 
law firms uphold meritorious standards of retention and promotion and are 
helpless to effectuate change in the face of societal stereotypes and implicit 
biases that plague their culture, policies, and decision makers, 
disproportionately impacting diverse lawyers.  Critics retort that BigLaw is 
simply unwilling to bear the significant cost of combating negative 
stereotypes and implicit bias and rid itself of their harmful consequences.  
Importantly, both BigLaw advocates and its critics agree that the root of the 
problem of underrepresentation is exogenous to BigLaw:  it does not create 
the underrepresentation of women and minority lawyers, it merely reflects 
and tolerates the harsh phenomena of stereotyping and implicit bias that 
exist outside of it. 
This traditional understanding of the interplay between merit, 
stereotypes, and implicit bias, however, is incomplete and misleading.  
BigLaw and its lawyers engage in complex transactions, exchanging labor 
and economic, social, cultural, and identity capital, which includes 
commodifying gender and racial identities.  The underrepresentation of 
diverse lawyers is therefore endogenous to the exchange and is a function of 
the following considerations.  For one, women and minority lawyers tend to 
have lower (and sometimes even negative) endowments of capital, 
compared with their Caucasian male counterparts.  Further, capital 
endowments both impact and are misrecognized for merit and therefore 
play a significant role in BigLaw’s retention and promotion policies.  
Finally, BigLaw and its lawyers appear to be ignorant, to misunderstand, or 
to deny the impact of capital on their relationship. 
A better, more equal future at BigLaw depends on its willingness to 
acknowledge the role of capital, and, in particular, of identity capital—pink 
and blue, black and white—in its hiring, retention and promotion policies 
by practicing capital transparency; on its willingness to trade capital with its 
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lawyers on fair and just terms honoring capital boundaries; and on its 
willingness to help build the capital infrastructure of all of its lawyers by 
abandoning its equal treatment principles and replacing them with equal 
opportunity policies.  Fortunately, capital analysis provides BigLaw with 
both the language and the tools to begin to successfully pursue enhanced 
diversity in its positions of power and influence. 
